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Abstract  
 
Over the past two decades, offshore outsourcing to emerging economies, such as 
China, has been viewed by firms as an efficient way to gain competitive advantage. 
Literature indicates that offshore outsourcing can enhance firms’ competitiveness and 
efficiency by reducing costs, expanding relational ties, freeing up scarce resources, 
and leveraging capabilities. However, the research relating to risk management of 
offshore outsourcing relationships has not been widely reflected in extant literature.  
This study addresses this research gap by developing a conceptual model that 
examines the association between management approaches and the risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. This study applies two types of risks being relational risk 
and performance risk, as dependent variables. Based on social exchange theory and 
transaction cost theory, this study proposes two management approaches to minimise 
risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, which are the relational approach and the 
transactional approach.  
 
Empirical testing of the conceptual model employed a quantitative approach using an 
online survey of 41 managers from Australia and New Zealand. The survey data was 
analysed using a multiple regression technique, which revealed four valuable findings. 
Firstly, a higher level of relational risk leads to a higher level of performance risk. 
Secondly, the relational approach, based on interdependence of outsourcing exchange 
firms, can reduce performance risk. Thirdly, an increased level of relationship-specific 
investments contributes to the rise of performance risk. More importantly, the survey 
results show that relational risk plays a mediating role between relational factors and 
performance risk. This study recommends that offshore outsourcing firms employ the 
relational approach to manage performance risk. The mediating role of relational risk 
also indicates that firms should not just concentrate on minimising the performance 
risks of offshore outsourcing relationships, but should also manage relational risks 
due to uncooperative behaviours such as opportunism. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the topic of interest for this study. Firstly, an initial overview 
describes the broad field of offshore outsourcing risks and relationship management. 
The second section provides a brief revision of the existing literature in the overall 
field, which leads into the research gap. It is followed by an outline of research 
objectives, contributions, and research questions. Finally, the last sections give an 
introductory overview of the research methodology and an outline of the sections 
covered in this thesis.  
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Offshore outsourcing to emerging economies has grown rapidly in recent years 
(Chadee & Raman, 2009). It is suggested that outsourcing allows firms to improve 
their performance by reducing costs, increasing flexibility, accessing new capabilities 
and focusing on core business (Kotabe, 1992; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Di Gregorio et 
al., 2001; Tate et al., 2009). However, benefits from outsourcing cannot be achieved if 
the associated risks are not accurately identified and managed (Aron et al., 2005b). 
Oza and Hall (2005) argued that relationship management is a crucial factor in 
outsourcing success.  
 
Offshore outsourcing research has established that developing a cooperative 
relationship based on trust, commitment, and information sharing is critical to 
outsourcing success (Lee & Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001; Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009). 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2005) point out that poor management of outsourcing 
relationships reduces opportunities for firms to gain competitive advantage. Hence, it 
is useful to examine the key risks in managing offshore outsourcing relationships and 
the mechanisms available for firms to control them. 
 
1.2 Research gap 
 
This study identified two research gaps relating to offshore outsourcing relationship 
management. Firstly, offshore outsourcing research has largely emphasised the 
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benefits of outsourcing and how outsourcing can contribute to a firm’s competitive 
advantage (Kotabe, 1992; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Di Gregorio et al., 2009). 
However, there is a lack of understanding of the risks in managing offshore 
outsourcing relationships. Secondly, a lot of research attention has been paid to 
examining the relationship between partnership quality and offshore outsourcing 
success (Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001; Barthelemy, 2003b). In 
contrast, there is lack of research development on how and what kind of management 
approaches are used to effectively minimise the risks of offshore outsourcing 
relationships.  
 
These findings are consistent with analysis by Chadee and Raman (2009). These 
authors pointed out that a significant amount of attention has been focussed on 
outsourcing management, particularly in forms of contracts and relationships. 
However, there is a lack of understanding of the possible risk factors in supplier 
relationship management and the types of management approaches that can 
effectively minimise risks of offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
1.3 Research objective 
 
Based on the discussions of research gaps in the literature, the objective of this study 
is to determine whether management approaches can minimise risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. In order to fulfil this research objective, this study will 
firstly determine the risks relating to offshore outsourcing relationships and secondly, 
uncover management approaches that can reduce risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. Finally, the study will develop and test a research model that recognises 
the link between management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships.  
 
1.4 Research contributions  
 
Four important contributions have been made to the existing knowledge of offshore 
outsourcing.  
 
Firstly, research relating to managing risks in offshore outsourcing relationships has 
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not been adequately reflected in the literature. This study expands current literature by 
addressing this research gap. This study also applied social exchange theory and 
transactional cost theory to construct a conceptual model of risk management in 
offshore outsourcing relationships, which builds a theoretical foundation for future 
testing.  
 
Secondly, this study operationalised relational risk and performance risk from a 
conceptual base (Das & Teng, 1996) and applied it in the context of offshore 
outsourcing. In addition, empirically testing relational risk for a mediating effect in 
this study is a novel concept in offshore outsourcing literature. Furthermore, by 
employing a China-specific factor (guanxi), this study adds a ‘cultural characteristic’ 
to the investigation of offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
Thirdly, the quantitative survey result revealed that the relational risk in the offshore 
outsourcing relationship played a critical role as a mediator between relational factors 
and performance risk. The implication of this finding demonstrates the importance of 
minimising relational risk in managing offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
A final contribution is made to the contextual understanding of risk management in 
offshore outsourcing relationships. In comparison with Europe and North America, 
less offshore outsourcing research has focussed on outsourcing firms in New Zealand 
and Australia. It is useful to extend the existing research context by examining risks in 
offshore outsourcing relationships from New Zealand and Australian perspectives.  
 
This study also chooses to focus on China as a study context for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Buckley, 2007), which is 
valuable to study. Secondly, China is an important trading destination for Australian 
and New Zealand outsourcing firms (Australian Department of Affairs and Trade, 
2010; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). Thus, this study 
provides useful insights for Australian and New Zealand outsourcing firms into 
managing risks in offshore outsourcing relationships with China. 
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1.5 Research questions  
 
Based on the previous discussions, three research questions were formulated as 
follows: 
 
1. What are the risks in managing offshore outsourcing relationships? 
2. What are the effective management approaches in minimising the risks of 
offshore outsourcing relationships? 
3. Is there a direct link between management approaches and offshore 
outsourcing supplier risks? 
 
1.6 Research model  
 
To examine the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, this study introduced two 
types of risks: relational risk and performance risk (dependent variables) that have 
been conceptualised by Das and Teng (1996). Based on social exchange theory and 
transaction cost theory, this study proposes two management approaches to minimise 
outsourcing supplier risks: the relational approach and the transactional approach. The 
relationship between the management approaches and outsourcing supplier risks are 
illustrated in Figure 1.1 below: 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The basic model of managing offshore outsourcing supplier risks 
 
It is assumed that a relational approach is best to manage relational risk; whereas, a 
 
Relational 
Approach  
 
 
Performance Risk 
 
 
Relational Risk 
 
Transactional 
Approach 
Yiying (Cindy) Zhang_Master of Commerce and Administration _School of Marketing and International Business 
 
5 
 
transactional approach is more likely to be an effective management approach to 
reduce performance risk. This study also proposes that a higher level of relational risk 
can lead to a higher level of performance risk. 
 
1.7 Methodological approach 
 
In order to test the conceptual model and relevant hypotheses, a quantitative research 
method using an online survey was employed to test the role of relational and 
transactional approaches in managing the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
The purpose of using a quantitative survey research method is to deductively test 
theories and establish specific relationship factors from a large representative sample 
of respondents (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Hair et al., 2009). The survey data was 
analysed using SPSS version 18. Statistical procedures used in this study range from 
basic techniques such as descriptive and frequencies analysis, to more advanced 
techniques such as multiple regression analysis.  
 
1.8 Outline of the thesis 
 
This chapter provides a holistic view on the research topic of managing risks in 
offshore outsourcing relationships. The aim of Chapter 2 is to build a theoretical 
foundation by reviewing relevant literature to identify key research issues. Chapter 3 
presents the development of a conceptual research model and pertinent hypotheses in 
an attempt to explain the relationship between outsourcing supplier risks and 
management approaches. Chapter 4 describes research design, the chosen 
methodology, data collection process, and statistical procedures for analysing the 
quantitative survey. Additionally, Chapter 4 presents the important results of the 
validity and reliability tests of this study. Chapter 5 shows the results obtained from 
the quantitative survey. Chapter 6 provides an in-depth discussion of the survey 
results and highlights the contributions of this study to the existing literature. Chapter 
7 concludes the thesis by providing managerial implications, limitations of the 
research and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This chapter will firstly present a broad review of the topic of offshore outsourcing. 
The second section reviews relevant management approaches to offshore outsourcing 
relationships. The third section focuses on the main risks associated with offshore 
outsourcing, with particular attention being paid to the risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. Lastly, this chapter determines some key research issues by identifying 
important gaps in offshore outsourcing literature. Furthermore, this chapter proposes a 
research problem that will guide this study in attempting to fill the gaps in extant 
literature.  
 
2.1 Offshore outsourcing  
 
The following sections provide some background information on offshore outsourcing 
including definitions, motives and theoretical underpinnings.  
 
2.1.1 Defining offshore outsourcing  
 
It is indicated by Mol et al. (2005) that offshore outsourcing has become an important 
topic in the international business (IB) literature. According to their investigation of 
published sources in the ProQuest database, the number of academic articles on 
(out)sourcing considerably increased between 1970 and 2000.  
 
Numerous terms and definitions of offshore outsourcing are employed by academic 
researchers and practitioners, which often causes great confusion (Mol et al., 2005; 
Chadee & Raman, 2009; Di Gregorio et al., 2009). The terms used include insourcing, 
outsourcing, offshore outsourcing and domestic outsourcing.  
 
In particular, the terms offshoring and outsourcing are often confused. Offshoring 
refers to the process of sourcing products and services across national boundaries 
(Lewin et al., 2009). Offshoring may include both international in-house sourcing and 
international outsourcing. In comparison, outsourcing refers solely to the process of 
contracting out products or services that were provided internally (insourcing) to 
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external providers (Sako, 2005). Outsourcing can be conducted domestically (onshore) 
and internationally (offshore). The distinctions between offshoring and outsourcing 
are clarified in Figure 2.1 as set out below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustrating Offshore Outsourcing adopted from Sako (2005) 
 
Figure 2.1 indicates that insourcing of goods and services can be achieved through 
domestic insourcing (Box 3) and offshore insourcing (Box 1). Correspondingly, 
outsourcing of goods and services can be carried out either domestically (Box 4 
domestic outsourcing) or internationally (Box 2 offshore outsourcing). It is also 
illustrated in Figure 2.1 that offshoring can be conducted in-house through foreign 
subsidiaries (Box 1 offshore insourcing) or contracted out to external foreign 
providers (Box 2 offshore outsourcing). The focus of this thesis is on offshore 
outsourcing1 of the manufacturing function from New Zealand and Australia to China.  
 
2.1.2 Motives for offshore outsourcing 
 
Literature has revealed various rationales for firms’ decisions to undertake 
outsourcing (Cavusgile et al., 1993; Kotabe & Murray, 2004; Schniederjans & 
Zuckweiler, 2004; Tate et al., 2009). Outsourcing is not just a straightforward 
financial or purchasing decision, but a complex strategic business decision (Costa, 
                                                        
1 From this section onwards, this study refers to offshore outsourcing as outsourcing. 
Outsourcing 
Domestic 
Insourcing 
Offshore 
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2001). The motives for undertaking outsourcing vary, depending on each firm’s 
individual circumstances. It is argued that outsourcing may not be appropriate for 
every firm. If a firm chooses the wrong reasons to outsource, it could suffer major 
setbacks, such as losing control over outsourced activities and losing core 
competencies (Gupta and Gupta, 1992; Bathelemy, 2001).  
 
Seeking cost reduction is viewed as one of the main motives for outsourcing 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2005; Farrell, 2005; Di Gregorio et al., 2009). Outsourcing 
allows firms to exploit cost advantages in less-developed countries such as cheaper 
labour, material, components, and transportation costs, which consequently reduces 
costs (Dunning, 1998). Farrell (2005) argues that savings from outsourcing can also 
be re-invested into new, higher value-added products, and then passed onto customers 
in the form of a better price.  
 
Outsourcing literature also indicates that focusing on core competencies is regarded as 
one of the main motivations for outsourcing decisions (Saunders et al., 1997; Quinn & 
Duhamel, 2003). A core competency is a special capability or expertise that 
determines whether a firm can sustain its competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). Outsourcing allows firms to concentrate their efforts on activities that drive 
competitive advantages while contracting out peripheral activities, enabling it to 
leverage the specialist skills of the supplier (Di Gregorio et al., 2009). It is indicated 
that some firms may not have the necessary skills or expertise to develop peripheral 
activities, due to a lack of resources and high costs (Costa, 2001). Outsourcing offers 
firms opportunities to gain relevant skills without encountering the difficulties of 
attracting and retaining highly-trained individuals (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; Quinn, 
1999). Gupta and Gupta (1992) further argue that by acquiring the specialised 
knowledge of others, firms would avoid the risks associated with building 
specialisation in-house. Thus the benefits of gaining specialised capability externally 
can add more value for firms and serve customers in a more efficient and low cost 
manner.  
 
Outsourcing exposes firms to global talent and enables firms to select ‘best-in-world’ 
suppliers (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). It is argued that accessing the new skills and 
technologies of foreign suppliers facilitates firms’ achievement of competitive 
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advantage and efficiency (Cavusgil et al., 1993). By taking advantage of suppliers’ 
skills and expertise, firms are given more flexibility to experiment with new ideas and 
responses to market changes, such as intensified global competition, rapid diffusion of 
technology, reduced time-to-market and increasingly sophisticated consumers (Apte 
et al., 1997; McIvor, 2005).  
 
Competitive pressure has also been identified as a key driver for firms’ outsourcing 
decisions. The existing literature reveals that competitive pressure may arise from 
external pressure, strong supplier marketing efforts and management attitudes 
(Pinnington & Woolcock, 1995; McFarlan & Nolan, 1995). Firms can lower the risks 
of external competitive pressure by observing and imitating successful industry 
leaders (Tate et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 Theoretical underpinnings of offshore outsourcing  
 
Three theoretical perspectives are found to be most relevant to the purpose of this 
study. They are transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), the resource-
based view (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfeldt, 1989; Barney, 1991), and the relational view 
(Dryer & Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The following sections will evaluate 
all three perspectives to gain a theoretical understanding in the areas of outsourcing 
decisions, outsourcing relationship management, and outsourcing risk management.  
 
2.2.1 Transaction cost theory  
 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) has been widely used to examine a firm’s decision on 
outsourcing, or the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ options (Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Ellram et al, 
2008; Tate et al., 2008, 2009), and assumes that a firm’s outsourcing decision is based 
on economic rationales (Williamson, 1975).  
 
Literature indicates three transaction cost variables may influence a firm’s outsourcing 
decisions (Mahnke et al., 2005; McIvor, 2005). Firstly, asset specificity refers to the 
extent to which specific assets are required to support a particular activity 
(Williamson, 1975). Specific asset investment can be in the forms of (1) physical 
assets such as customised machinery or tools, (2) human assets including specialised 
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skills and knowledge required in the activities, (3) site specificity, for example a 
natural resource available at a certain location, and (4) dedicated assets (Williamson, 
1983). Secondly, uncertainty refers to the unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding a transaction which includes behavioural and environmental uncertainties 
(Williamson, 1985). Finally, transaction frequency is viewed as the number of 
transactions (Williamson, 1985).  
 
Although all three variables are considered important, asset specificity is regarded as 
the most crucial variable (Williamson 1981). A highly asset-specific investment 
requires costs that may not be re-deployed or transferred to another transaction 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). Thus, the higher the asset specificity of a given transaction, 
the more likely a firm is to internalise its activity (Walker & Weber, 1984). As asset 
specificity and uncertainty increase, the risk of opportunism increases as well. In 
response, firms are more likely to source internally. It is argued that high transaction 
frequencies will escalate costs (Williamson, 1985). In summary, firms should 
outsource activities when asset specificity is low, uncertainty is insignificant, and 
transactions are relatively infrequent.  
 
While TCT provides a good theoretical basis for understanding firms’ outsourcing 
decisions, it is limited because the rationale behind an outsourcing decision may vary 
with applications, industries and organisations (Costa, 2001). For example, some 
firms in technical service industries still choose to outsource specialised capabilities, 
even though the costs of acquiring externally are excessively high. Applying the logic 
of TCT, firms should develop the capabilities internally when the transaction costs of 
outsourcing specialised capabilities are high. However, Lewin et al (2009) found the 
reason behind firms’ outsourcing decisions is to stay competitive by accessing global 
talent and innovation. Thus, the decision to outsource does not depend solely on 
economic rationales.    
 
2.2.1.1 Applying TCT to outsourcing relationship management 
 
When it comes to managing outsourcing relationships, TCT promotes the 
development and enforcement of formal contracts for safeguarding firms from any 
potential risks that might arise in the buyer-supplier relationships. Firms completely 
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rely on formal agreements, such as a formal contract that carefully defines the nature 
of the activities, to resolve any unforeseeable outcomes (Williamson, 1985; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). A detailed formal contract has been found to have a huge impact on the 
effective management of outsourcing relationships as it helps to protect the buyer firm 
from the potential opportunism of the supplier firm (Saunders et al., 1997; Barthelemy, 
2001, 2003a). 
 
According to TCT, factors including uncertainty, asset specificity, and measurement 
difficulties, contribute negatively to the management of outsourcing buyer-supplier 
relationships. Firstly, uncertainty can be in the form of a behaviour uncertainty and an 
environmental uncertainty. Opportunism is regarded as a behavioural uncertainty, 
referring to decision makers acting out of self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1985). 
The threat of opportunism requires outsourcing exchange firms to prepare highly-
detailed formal contracts that will protect them against unforeseen events. A high level 
of environmental uncertainty in offshore outsourcing due to geographical and cultural 
differences increases the likelihood of a supplier firm’s opportunism, as the buyer firm 
would find it difficult to monitor the behaviours of its supplier over the geographical 
separation (Tate & Ellram, 2009). Consequently, a highly-specified formal contract 
can help the buyer firm to monitor a supplier firm’s behaviours (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002).  
 
Secondly, a high level of asset specificity in outsourcing relationships may open the 
door to opportunistic behaviours (McIvor, 2009). In order to limit the threat of 
opportunism and encourage the longevity of buyer-supplier relationships, outsourcing 
exchange firms are expected to adopt formal contracts, not only specifying actions 
and the conditions of contractual breach, but also provisions for resolving unforeseen 
disputes (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), since any failure and subsequent losses could be 
significant to both exchange firms. 
 
Finally, difficulties in measuring the performance of outsourcing buyer firms may 
cause confusion about whether the supplier firm has fulfilled its obligations and 
delivered according to the prior agreement (Williamson, 1985). When the outsourcing 
supplier firm minimises its input towards fulfilling the agreement, the outsourcing 
buyer firm receives less value on already-paid-for products or services due to the 
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inability to measure performance. In this case, outsourcing buyer firms are expected 
to develop better specifications and measurements within their formal contracts, 
allowing them to accurately monitor and evaluate performance. 
 
2.2.1.2 Applying TCT to outsourcing risks 
 
TCT is also useful when it comes to evaluating the various risks of outsourcing. Firms 
may encounter risks before (ex-ante) and after (ex-post) a contract is closed. In the ex-
ante contract phase, transaction cost theory provides the necessary tools for firms to 
determine whether it is feasible to outsource an activity by assessing macro risks in 
offshore outsourcing, such as political and cultural risks (McIvor, 2009). In the ex-
post contract phase, a transactional management approach guided by TCT assists 
outsourcing firms in managing the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. The 
transactional approach develops through the use of formal contract, in which rules are 
well-defined and any failure to deliver agreed products or services by either party will 
be resolved by litigation and the penalties in the contract (Henderson, 1990; Lee & 
Kim, 1999). In the ex-post contract phase, outsourcing exchange firms may choose to 
minimise risks in offshore outsourcing through inter-firm cooperation. Cooperation 
between the firms can result in a high level of interdependence, which may open the 
door for opportunistic behaviours. Through the utilisation of formal contracts, the 
transactional approach can protect outsourcing exchange firms from potential 
opportunism.  
 
2.2.2 Resource-based view  
 
The resource-based view (RBV) is increasingly being considered as an alternative 
explanation for a firm’s decision to outsource (Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Kotabe & 
Murray, 2004; Doh, 2005; Tate et al., 2009). The RBV considers the firm as a unique 
bundle of assets and resources which, if managed in a distinctive way, can achieve 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Resources that are valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable can contribute to firm-specific capabilities. The 
RBV argues firm-specific capabilities are inherently complex, causally ambiguous, 
and difficult to replicate (Barney, 1991; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). This assumption 
implies that when a firm lacks capabilities in a certain area, it is more efficient to gain 
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access to skills and capabilities in external markets. 
 
Applying the RBV, outsourcing decisions are driven more by resource considerations 
and less by transaction cost factors. A firm will internalise its activities when 
possessing valuable strategic resources in order to exploit better future value than its 
competitors (Doh, 2005). On the other hand, when a firm has relatively fewer 
valuable and rare resources, outsourcing enables a firm to acquire complementary 
resources to fill the resource gaps and to develop new capabilities (Costa, 2001; 
Kotabe and Murray, 2004; Mahnke et al., 2005). In addition, Quinn and Hilmer (1994) 
argue that firms should concentrate on their core competencies while capitalising on 
the capabilities of others by contracting out peripheral activities. Accordingly, firms 
may improve flexibility and free up scarce resources for even greater value creation 
(Barney, 1991; Costa, 2001; Mahnke et al., 2005). However, Barthelemy (2001) 
indicated that outsourcing firms often found it hard to determine their core business 
function. 
 
2.2.2.1 Applying RBV to outsourcing relationship management  
 
Successfully managing the buyer-supplier relationship is crucial in the context of the 
RBV, since buyer firms rely on their supplier’s superior skill and innovative 
technologies to achieve competitive advantage (Kotabe & Murray, 2004; Doh, 2005). 
In addition, when competitors become more competent, it is necessary for buyer firms 
to recognise the need to access the supplier’s complementary capabilities in order to 
close the gap with competitors (McIvor, 2009). On the other hand, supplier firms can 
better develop their core competencies through outsourcing exchanges with buyer 
firms. Therefore, it involves both firms mutually leveraging each other’s resources 
and capabilities in order to derive competitive advantage. Consequently, it becomes 
necessary to accurately address the development of long-term relationships as the 
intensity of the relationship increases during the outsourcing venture (Mahnke et al., 
2005).  
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2.2.1.2 Applying RBV to outsourcing risks 
 
In order to create competitive advantage, the RBV encourages outsourcing exchange 
firms to develop collaborative relationships as a means of reducing the risk of 
opportunism while acquiring expertise and technical resources externally (Duncan, 
1998; McIvor, 2009). A collaborative relationship allows outsourcing exchange firms 
to obtain and maintain complementary capabilities where there are resource 
constraints (McIvor, 2009). Although the RBV contributes to the insights of managing 
risks in offshore outsourcing, the focus of the RBV is on the creation of competitive 
advantage through resource analysis, not on the minimisation of risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. Accordingly, the application of the RBV does not appear 
compatible with the purpose of this study, which is to determine the link between 
management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
2.2.3 Relational view 
 
The relational view (RV) is often used to gain understanding of how firms can gain 
and sustain competitive advantage. This view is employed particularly in the area of 
inter-firm relationships. It has evolved from the limitations of TCT and the extended 
understanding of achieving competitive advantages offered by the RBV (Mclvor, 
2009). The RBV claims that the firm must possess unique resources that enable the 
firm to achieve competitive advantage. The characteristics of these unique resources 
need to be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, which are viewed as terms 
of specificity by the transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1991). Therefore, when 
firms choose to outsource activities comprising unique resources, the firm’s 
performance can be negatively affected by the risk of opportunism and the threat of 
contract termination (Klein et al., 1987). The RV argues that firms can develop critical 
resources by carefully managing relationships with external parties including 
suppliers, customers, and government agencies (Mahnke et al., 2005). Firms can gain 
and sustain competitive advantages by accessing these critical resources in a unique 
way that spans firms’ boundaries (Dryer & Singh, 1998).  
 
In addition, the RV expands the understanding of achieving competitive advantage 
offered by the RBV. The RBV sees competitive advantage arising from the remaining 
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activities constituting core competences within the firm, whereas the RV considers the 
competitive advantage to be embedded in social relationships placed outside the firm, 
rather than arising through the remaining activities within the firm (Granovetter, 
1985). Dryer and Singh (1998) argue that combined capabilities of exchange parties 
can create a relational rent, which is a supernormal profit jointly generated in a 
relationship. Furthermore, the relational rent-generating process cannot be achieved 
by either firm in isolation (Dryer & Singh, 1998). In the case of offshore outsourcing, 
buyer and supplier firms may generate these supernormal profits by focusing on the 
relationship benefits, which require outsourcing exchange firms to share close inter-
firm relational ties involving trust and mutual commitment. In addition, such close 
relational ties provide outsourcing firms with safeguards from exchange hazards such 
as opportunistic behaviours (Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009). The RV provides a 
broader concept from which social exchange theory (SET) derives; this study is only 
going to utilise SET for the operational part of this study. 
 
2.2.3.1 Social exchange theory 
 
Social exchange theory (SET) is closely associated with the relational view. It focuses 
on the social and behavioural perspective of the outsourcing relationship, whereas 
TCT concentrates primarily on economic aspects of the outsourcing relationship. Kern 
and Willcock (2000) point out that research in outsourcing draws heavily upon TCT 
for explanatory frameworks. The core view of TCT states that outsourcing firms do 
not interact with each other but directly with the market (Williamson 1985). However, 
SET considers that the outsourcing firms interact with each other as exchange actions 
contingent on rewarding reactions from others (Blau, 1964). Thus, it is argued that the 
understanding of the outsourcing relationship should not solely rely on an economic 
view but also on social views (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1981; Cook, 2000).  
 
SET was originally developed to examine interpersonal exchanges within a societal 
environment (Homans, 1958; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Blau, 1964). The aim of SET is 
to understand the underlying social structures and behaviours of each actor that shape 
the exchange of resources and benefits (Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1976). SET has been 
increasingly employed in outsourcing to address the issue of managing inter-firm ties 
in outsourcing relationships (Lee & Kim, 1999; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Gottschalk 
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& Solli-Sæther, 2005; Lai, 2009). SET suggests that the need for social exchange is 
initiated by the scarcity of resources, which motivate individuals to engage with each 
other to gain valuable inputs. The assumption of SET is that exchange firms are 
intending to gain benefits from the exchange relationship that would not be achievable 
on their own (Blau, 1964; Molm, 1997). This assumption requires outsourcing 
exchange firms to collaborate and cooperate with each other in order to obtain 
simultaneous benefits. Thus, outsourcing exchange firms will maintain an ongoing 
reciprocal relationship in which the benefits of continuing the relationship are more 
attractive than other alternatives (Blau, 1964).  
 
It is also assumed by SET that firms evaluate the outcomes of exchange relationships 
based on cost and benefit analysis. Resources provided to negative outcomes of the 
exchange are considered as costs. Conversely, resources contributed to positive 
outcomes of the exchange are seen as benefits (Molm, 1997). Thus, SET requires 
exchange firms to behave in certain ways to maximise the benefits of the exchange 
and to minimise the costs since the negative outcome of the exchange would result in 
relationship termination (Molm, 1997). 
 
2.2.3.2 Applying SET to outsourcing risks  
 
SET offers important guidance on diminishing outsourcing risks, which suggests that 
the enforcement of obligations, promises and expectations occurs through social 
exchanges and that those social exchanges mitigate hazards associated with specific 
asset investments and uncertainty (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The expectation of 
relationship longevity encourages parties to protect exchange-specific investments in 
consideration of the mutually-imposed costs of termination (Blau, 1964).  
Outsourcing firms may encounter a high risk of free riding given that reciprocity in 
the exchange relationship is voluntary. Therefore, outsourcing buyer and supplier 
firms involved in exchange relationships have a high need for trust. Trust among 
outsourcing exchange firms reduces anxiety and allows reciprocity to take place over 
time.  
 
According to SET, outsourcing firms promote more relational, informal safeguards 
like trust and commitment rather than having third party and formal safeguards such 
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as legal contracts (Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009). Informal safeguards provide the 
flexibility to manage any unforeseeable events and are considered to have a greater 
ability to minimise the costs of exchange hazards than that of formal contracts (Zaheer 
& Venkatraman, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Alder, 2001). SET argues that social capital such 
as trust and commitment also contribute to the prevention of transaction costs caused 
by opportunistic behaviours and conflict between partners (Uzzi, 1997; Kale et al., 
2000; Alder, 2001). 
 
2.2.4 Comparing TCT with SET in managing offshore outsourcing relationships 
 
There are important differences between TCT and SET. TCT promotes the utilisation 
of detailed formal contracts that might provide opportunities for outsourcing firms to 
minimise exchange hazards. However, overly-specified contracts reduce flexibility 
between supplier and buyer firms (Mahnk et al., 2005). The focus of TCT is on single 
transactions as units of analysis, which assume no interactions between outsourcing 
parties but directly with the market. Therefore TCT fails to recognise that the 
development of collaborative behaviours require outsourcing parties to interact 
continually with each other (Doz & Prahalad, 1991). Furthermore, explicit and 
detailed contracts specified according to TCT may also signal distrust, and hence 
aggravate opportunistic behaviours (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). In contrast, relational 
contracts based on mutual trust are regarded as substitutes (Uzzi, 1997; Alder, 2001) 
or complements for explicit contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). To conclude, TCT-
guided formal contracts are necessary but not sufficient when fully explaining 
outsourcing relationship management.  
 
SET elements such as trust and commitment play an important role in successful in-
firm relationships, and they have been considered to be the key relationship norms of 
a variety of inter-firm relationships (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Wu & Cavusgil, 2006; Kwon, 2008; Han et al., 2008). In contrast to managing 
relationships by formal contract guided by TCT, informal relational governance based 
on trust is argued to have the ability to discourage opportunistic behaviours, lower the 
need for monitoring and facilitate contractual adaptation (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; 
Alder, 2001). 
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2.3 Managing outsourcing interactions 
 
The analysis of the four theoretical perspectives has provided an important 
understanding of how firms can achieve and sustain competitive advantage through 
outsourcing by reducing transaction costs, tapping into the capabilities of others, and 
managing relationships in a unique way. It has been argued that an outsourcing firm’s 
ability to effectively manage inter-firm relationships with its foreign suppliers is a key 
determinant of outsourcing success (Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001; 
Barthelemy, 2003; Feeny et al., 2005; Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009). Successful 
relationships may assist firms in achieving performance objectives and mitigating the 
risks associated with offshore outsourcing. By employing astute relationship 
management approaches, it is possible for outsourcing firms to leverage the 
capabilities of suppliers in a more effective way than other competitors. However, 
failure of a buyer-supplier relationship can be very costly for both buyer and supplier 
firms (Aron et al., 2005; Herath & Kishore, 2009). In practice, managing the 
outsourcing relationship requires a considerable amount of detailed administration, 
cooperation and coordination between buyer and supplier firms, which does not 
guarantee a desired outcome. Thus it becomes a significant challenge for many 
outsourcing firms to employ the appropriate management approach to facilitate the 
development of a successful relationship. 
 
2.3.1 Existing relationship approaches  
 
Research of the outsourcing literature revealed that firms can manage their 
relationships through a formal approach or an informal relational approach (Lee & 
Kim, 1999; Barthelemy, 2003b). The formal approach of managing relationships is 
well grounded in TCT, which promotes the utilisation of an explicit and well-defined 
contract. A formal contract is critical in the outsourcing process as it defines the role, 
responsibilities, requirements and ongoing performance measurements (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). A good quality contract protects the outsourcing firms from the 
potential risks arising during the exchange process. It also allows outsourcing 
exchange firms to set expectations and commit themselves to short and medium-term 
goals (Gulati, 1995). On the other hand, formal contracts cannot predict all the 
changes and future needs that lie ahead. The presence of incomplete contracts implies 
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that firms’ outsourcing goals may not be able to be met (Kern & Willcock, 2000; 
Ellram et al., 2008). Thus, outsourcing firms are required to constantly add updates 
and changes to a contract, which entails additional transaction costs.  
 
An informal relational approach is guided by SET, which involves a series of repeated 
exchanges that make the outsourcing buyer and the supplier firms interdependent, and 
so expects coordinated action and cooperation in order to achieve mutual benefits 
(Lee & Kim, 1999). Hence, outsourcing firms are required to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness over time. In contrast to the formal approach of relationship exchange, 
the enforcement of obligations, responsibilities and expectations occurs through a 
social process that promotes norms such as trust, commitment, cooperation, and 
information sharing. These social norms offer flexibility, which facilitates adaptation 
to unforeseeable events and minimises the high costs of exchange hazards (Macaulay, 
1963; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Alder, 2001).  
 
The management of the buyer-supplier relationship can be influenced by the 
objectives of the overall outsourcing strategy. Outsourcing firms may want to achieve 
tangible objectives including reduced costs, increased productivity, better service 
levels in the form of on-time deliveries and better quality (McIvor, 2005). In this case, 
a formal approach of relationship exchange will be more effective as it allows 
outsourcing firms to reduce transaction costs and in particular relationship-specific 
investments. On the other hand, outsourcing firms may aim to achieve a long-term 
objective such as developing complementary skills and capabilities in a particular 
process and developing more innovative capabilities (McIvor, 2005). In this case, an 
informal relational approach is more appropriate since the objective requires a more 
collaborative interaction with suppliers over time in order to leverage these suppliers’ 
capabilities more fully. 
 
The choice of management approach can also be influenced by the level of risks in the 
supply market (McIvor, 2005). Risks such as hidden costs and opportunistic 
behaviours can create difficulties in firms’ abilities to sustain the long-term economic 
benefits of outsourcing. An explicit and well-specified contract provides the 
outsourcing firm with the chance to safeguard against potential opportunism and 
achieve short-term economic objectives. However, a formal contract cannot foresee 
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all uncertainties and it is costly to design a quality contract to mitigate all 
opportunistic behaviour during the outsourcing process. An informal approach, on the 
other hand, proposes relationship-based exchange in the form of mutual understanding, 
which is advantageous for settling disputes arising from opportunistic behaviours 
(Macaulay, 1963; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). In addition, an informal relational 
approach is a more effective and less costly alternative to a formal contract because it 
is a self-enforcing safeguard. Outsourcing exchange firms are expected to understand 
their responsibilities and be willing to perform actions that result in positive outcomes 
(Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985). Thus, an informal approach provides flexibility for 
outsourcing exchange firms to adjust to unforeseen circumstances.  
 
2.4 Outsourcing risks 
 
Managing risks and uncertainties is one of the primary objectives of firms operating 
globally (Ghoshal, 1987). It is noted by scholars that there are many risks and 
challenges associated with offshore outsourcing (Earl, 1996; Barthelemy, 2001; Kliem, 
2004; Rubin, 2009; Herath & Kishore, 2009). Outsourcing risks such as loss of 
internal know-how (Willcocks et al., 2004), loss of control over suppliers (Quinn & 
Hilmer, 1994), and reduced product quality (Kotabe and Murray, 2004) may lead to 
undesirable consequences. Therefore it is vital for firms to mitigate outsourcing risks 
and uncertainties in order to maximise returns on invested resources.  
 
2.4.1 Defining risk 
 
The concept of risk has been widely researched in various disciplines, such as 
economics, psychology, and healthcare. Each discipline interprets risk differently, 
depending on specific contexts and types (Ritchie and Marshall, 1993; Frosdick, 1997; 
Dhar & Balakrishnan, 2006). This study explores the term risk in the supply chain 
management literature which is the broader domain of the offshore outsourcing 
literature. Li and Barnes (2008: 254) defined risk in the context of supply chain 
management as “the probability or likelihood of danger and disruption, under which 
events would obstruct a company in achieving its planned objective”. According to 
Levine and Schneider (1997: 38), risk is identified as “…events that, if they occur, 
represent a material threat to an entity’s fortune”. These definitions are summarised 
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into three dimensions by Ritchie and Brindley (2007: 305), which are “likelihood or 
probability of occurrence of a particular event or outcome; consequences due to 
occurrence of a particular event or outcome; and a ‘causal pathway’ effect due to the 
nature of a particular event and its sources and causes”. This study interprets offshore 
outsourcing risk as the probability that undesirable events occurring will potentially 
lead or expose businesses to adverse outcomes.     
 
2.4.2 Phases of outsourcing risks 
 
This study examines outsourcing risks in two phases of the outsourcing process. 
Firstly, the ex-ante contract phase where risks occur during decision making, supplier 
selection, and contract development stages. Secondly, risk factors in the ongoing 
outsourcing supplier management stage (the ex-post contract phase) will be discussed 
thoroughly in Section 2.4.3. 
 
2.4.2.1 Risks in the ex-ante contract phase 
 
In the ex-ante contract phase, firms need to assess risks in the supply market 
environment such as political risks, cultural risks, and economic risks. Political risks 
are a major concern for offshore outsourcing firms because political instability and 
unpredictable changes in labour and environmental laws and regulations may result in 
undesirable consequences (Graf & Mudambi, 2005; Dhar & Balakrishnan, 2006; 
Ellram et al., 2008). Cultural and language barriers also contribute to overall 
outsourcing risks. Language barriers make communication difficult between client 
and supplier, which may lead to delays, misunderstanding and conflicts 
(Schniederjans & Zuckweiler, 2004; Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006). Cultural 
differences such as religion, social norms, and decision making styles can prevent 
client and supplier firms from building the necessary trust, undermining any 
collaborative efforts made in the outsourcing process (Graf & Mudambi, 2005; Dhar 
& Balakrishnan, 2006). Economic risk arises from the variability in the inflation rate 
and currency exchange rate, which can contribute negatively to the financial 
performance of outsourcing firms (Schniederjans & Zuckweiler, 2004; Dhar & 
Balakrishnan, 2006).  
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These macro environmental risks are perceived as exceptionally important when it 
comes to selecting an appropriate vendor in a certain location, and overall outsourcing 
considerations (Ellram et al., 2008; Herath & Kishore, 2009). According to 
Barthelemy (2003b), constructing a good contract is crucial to outsourcing 
performance, since contracts facilitate the client and the supplier establishing a 
balance of power. It is also indicated that a contract is a vital governance tool for 
managing the outsourcing relationship and mitigating risk (Goo et al., 2009). 
Conversely, a poorly formulated contract could have a significant negative impact on 
the potential risk in the ex-post contract phase in terms of contractual conflicts, 
supplier’s opportunistic behaviours and escalating costs (Bathelemy, 2003; Dhar & 
Balakrishnan, 2006; Tate & Ellram, 2009). The risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships (the ex-post contract phase) is discussed in the next section.  
 
2.4.3 The risks in offshore outsourcing relationships (the ex-post contract phase) 
 
Managing outsourcing relationships involves managing contracts and suppliers. The 
risks could arise from mismanagement of a contract as well as suppliers. In the ex-
post contract phase, supplier management is considered as the key aspect for 
outsourcing success (Lee & Kim, 1999; Barthelemy, 2003b; Haried & Ramamurthy, 
2009). However, numerous risks lie within the supplier management stage. Firms may 
experience risks due to a lack of outsourcing expertise; a supplier’s insufficient 
capability and opportunistic behaviours; high asset specificity; and conflicts and 
unintentional knowledge leakage.  
 
Firstly, it is suggested that a firm’s lack of outsourcing experience could cause 
unexpected transaction and management costs and loss of control over suppliers 
(Aubert et al., 1996; Bahili & Rivard, 2003; Barthelemy, 2003a). Literature also 
indicates that a firm’s strategic intent and motivation to outsource products and 
services is to save costs (Cavusgil et al, 1993; Costa, 2001; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 
2005). However, the risk of escalating costs arising from unexpected transactions and 
management costs have also been well-established in the literature (Mahnke et al., 
2005). When a firm suffers from a lack of outsourcing experience and expertise, it 
faces internal uncertainty due to unclear outsourcing requirements (Ellram et al., 
2008). Consequently, it may be difficult for a firm to accurately specify the level of 
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quality and performance required in the contract. Thus, firms are unlikely to foresee 
problems such as incomplete contract specifications, hidden costs, and management 
conflicts occurring in the future outsourcing operation (Earl, 1996; Aubert et al., 1996; 
Dhar & Balakrishnan, 2006). Quinn and Hilmer (1994) also argued that unresolved 
conflicts in the outsourcing management stage may cause client firms to lose control 
of their suppliers.  
 
Secondly, a supplier’s lack of capability and their opportunistic behaviours can result 
in quality issues, a longer period of lead time, and delayed delivery, or no delivery at 
all (Kotabe and Murray, 2004; Herath & Kishore, 2009; Barthelemy, 2003a; 
Enderwick, 2008). A supplier’s opportunistic behaviour is a deliberate action taken by 
the supplier in order to maximise their own profits (Aron et al., 2005). This kind of 
behaviour is not caused by the supplier’s lack of capability but by a wrong selection 
choice made by the buyer firm (Barthelemy, 2003a). Both issues impact negatively on 
outsourcing management.  
 
Thirdly, asset specificity refers to the level of customisation associated with the 
exchange (Williamson, 1985). Managing outsourcing relationships may require 
significant relationship-specific investments including physical and human assets 
(McIvor, 2009). Firms could possibly find themselves in a ‘lock-in’ situation due to 
asset specificity, when there are only a small number of qualified and available 
suppliers (Herath & Kishore, 2009). An increase in transaction costs from switching 
and transferring to another supplier also contributes to the risk of escalating costs in 
outsourcing management.  
 
Fourthly, as mentioned previously, firms’ inexperience and lack of expertise in 
outsourcing operations may create conflicts between client firms and their suppliers. 
According to inter-firm relationship management literature, many factors could 
trigger conflicts between the client firm and supplier, namely miscommunication, 
unbalanced information, lack of trust and commitment (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Wu 
& Cavusgil, 2006; Tate & Ellram, 2009; Haried & Ramanurthy, 2009). Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) argue that if conflicts are not resolved amicably, the results could lead to 
destructive outcomes including relationship termination.  
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Finally, the risk of an unintended knowledge leak is a major concern in outsourcing 
(Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Kakumanu & Portanova, 2006). Suppliers may attempt to 
misuse or steal proprietary knowledge for secondary purposes, such as reverse 
engineering or selling to competitors (Aron et al., 2005).  
 
2.4.4 Categorising risks in offshore outsourcing relationships 
 
Based on the revision of risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, this study adopts 
categorisation ideas from Das and Teng (1996) to analyse the risks in offshore 
outsourcing buyer-supplier relationships. These are relational risk and performance 
risk.  
 
2.4.4.1 Relational risk 
 
Relational risk is defined as the possibility and the consequence that the partners in 
inter-firm alliances do not fully commit themselves to a joint goal (Das & Teng, 1996). 
A successful outsourcing buyer-supplier relationship depends on effective cooperation 
between partners, since the intention of engaging each other is to exploit the benefits 
of cooperation. If one outsourcing partner fails to comply with cooperation, the level 
of confidence in a good working relationship will reduce (Das & Teng, 1996). Thus, 
the perceived relational risk increases. It is indicated by economists that outsourcing 
firms are always seeking self-interested benefits to maximise their own gain 
(Williamson, 1983, 1985). Opportunistic behaviours of outsourcing exchange firms 
are viewed as a typical source of relational risk, which includes secretly extorting or 
misusing a partner’s skills and knowledge to maximise their own benefits (Barthelemy, 
2003a; Ellram et al., 2008; Harried & Ramamurthy, 2009). Conflicts due to buyer 
firms’ inexperience, miscommunication and unbalanced information are also regarded 
as sources of relational risk, which could potentially lead to a loss of suppliers and 
termination of relationships. 
 
Das and Teng (1996) acknowledged that the degree of perceived relational risk is 
closely related to trust. According to MacAllister (1995), there are two forms of trust: 
cognition-based trust and affect-based trust. Cognition-based trust arises not only 
from an accumulated knowledge of performance, but also accomplishments resulting 
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from direct interactions with a partner that allow others to have confidence in this 
partner to make reliable and competent choices. The author also indicated that a focal 
partner needs to display evidence of trustworthiness. Scholars such as Ring and Van 
de Ven (1994) and Williamson (1993) viewed cognitive trust as a calculated risk since 
a partner’s future actions can be predicted by an accumulated knowledge of previous 
performance. Consequently, firms can minimise the probability of uncertainties by 
careful calculations. This study acknowledges the concept of cognitive trust, but 
disagrees with the description of trust as a type of risk.  
 
In contrast, affect-based trust is built on social and emotional bonds between partners 
which go beyond a regular business relationship. MacAllister (1995) indicated that 
partners in an exchange relationship make emotional investments and express genuine 
feelings and concerns for the welfare of partners. Thus, the emotional bond between 
partners provides the basis of trust. As the emotional bond deepens, trust in a partner 
may go beyond accumulated knowledge. The emotionally-motivated nature of affect-
based trust makes the relationship less transparent to the objective risk assessments 
perceived by economists (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). Affect-based trust encourages 
partners to interact on a personal level, which is greatly endorsed by social exchange 
theory. This study supports trust as an important element of social exchange theory, 
which can be utilised as an informal relational approach to managing risks in 
outsourcing relationships.  
 
2.4.4.2 Performance risk 
 
Performance risk addresses the possibility that the strategic objectives of partners are 
not successfully achieved, despite adequate cooperation being made by both partners 
(Das & Teng, 1996), and the subsequent consequences. Relational risk is viewed as an 
inter-firm phenomenon. Performance risk, on the other hand, includes all kinds of 
risks except those factors related to cooperation. There are various factors 
contributing to performance risk in managing outsourcing relationships, all of which 
can lead to the failure of a partnership or the decline of firm performance. Some 
factors that contribute to performance risk include supplier’s lack of capability and 
incomplete contractual specifications. As discussed in the previous section, a 
supplier’s lack of capabilities can result in a longer period of lead time, delayed, or no 
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delivery, and a reduction of quality level (Barthelemy, 2003a; Dhar & Balakrishnan, 
2006; Herath & Kishore, 2009). The choice that an outsourcing firm makes during the 
supplier selection process could be wrong due to a lack of experience or a lack of 
choices caused by a minimal number of available suppliers in the market. Thus, it 
becomes challenging for the outsourcing firm to monitor their outsourcing 
performance. In addition, incomplete contractual specifications due to a lack of 
experience and expertise with contract management will lead the buyer firm to cost 
escalation (Ellram et al., 2008). It is stressed that a good contract must be precise, 
complete and balanced (Barthelemy, 2003b). However, there is no such thing as a 
completed contract, due to constant changes occurring during the outsourcing process. 
Hence, the risk of incomplete contractual specifications can disrupt a firm’s overall 
outsourcing strategic objectives.  
 
2.5 Research problem 
 
This review of the literature has found that research on outsourcing supplier 
management has suffered from two main problems. Firstly, research has largely 
focused on the benefits of outsourcing and how outsourcing can contribute to a firm’s 
competitive advantage. There is a lack of understanding of the possible risk factors in 
different stages of the outsourcing process, particularly in supplier relationship 
management. Secondly, much attention has been paid to examining the relationship 
between partnership quality and offshore outsourcing success (Grover et al., 1996; 
Lee & Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001; Barthelemy, 2003b). In comparison, there has been 
limited research on how relationship management strategies can effectively minimise 
the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, and what types of strategies these 
actually are. These findings are consistent with those of Chadee and Raman (2009). 
They point out a significant amount of research effort has been placed on outsourcing 
management, particularly in the form of contracts and relationships. However, there is 
a lack of understanding of the possible risk factors in supplier relationship 
management and the types of management strategies that can effectively minimise 
these risks. This study will address the research gap by investigating the interaction 
between firms’ management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. 
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2.6 Research issue  
 
In order to fulfil the research gap discussed above, this study introduces two types of 
risks that are conceptualised by Das and Teng (1996). They are relational risk and 
performance risk. Based on SET and TCT, two management approaches are proposed 
to minimise the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships: a relational approach and a 
transactional approach. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the link between the two management 
approaches and the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptualising the link between management approaches and risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships 
 
Relational risk is associated with the probability that outsourcing buyer and supplier 
firms do not comply with the spirit of cooperation. A relational approach (RA) is 
guided by SET which regards the development of the outsourcing relationship as a 
dynamic process through repeated exchanges. The RA requires outsourcing buyer and 
supplier firms to collaborate and cooperate in order to achieve the mutual benefits of 
the exchange relationship (Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985). The RA also encourages 
outsourcing buyer and supplier firms to develop relationships based on social norms, 
such as trust and commitment, to overcome outsourcing relational risks caused by 
uncooperative behaviours such as opportunism. Thus, this study proposes that a 
relational approach is best to minimise relational risks. 
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outsourcing objectives, despite a satisfactory cooperation between outsourcing buyer 
and supplier firms. A transactional approach (TA) grounded in TCT indicates that 
outsourcing firms can develop and enforce formal contracts to resolve outsourcing 
performance risk, such as low quality and late delivery, caused by not achieving 
strategic objectives. Hence, TA is more likely to be an effective management approach 
to diminish performance risk. This study also proposes that a high level of relational 
risk can lead to a high level of performance risk, based on the rationale that when the 
supplier firm behaves opportunistically, the likelihood of having late delivery and low 
quality products also tends to be high.  
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter provides an overview of literature on offshore outsourcing. The focus of 
this study is to examine the effects of management approaches on risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. A range of theoretical perspectives were discussed and 
evaluated for the purpose of this research. Based on the conceptualisation from Das 
and Teng (1996), two risks of offshore outsourcing relationships were introduced: 
relational risk and performance risk. This study proposes a relational approach, based 
on the theoretical understanding of social exchange theory for minimising relational 
risk. In addition, a transactional approach based on transaction cost theory is put 
forward to diminish the performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of a conceptual model that illustrates the 
association between the two management approaches and the two risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual development 
 
After the presentation of the literature review in Chapter 2, the aim of this chapter is 
to describe the development of a conceptual model. This chapter starts by recapping 
outsourcing risks as the dependent variables of this study. Then, a conceptual model is 
presented in an attempt to explain the link between firms’ management approaches 
and the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
3.1 Recapping outsourcing risk (dependent variable) 
 
Outsourcing literature discussed in Chapter 2 revealed that risks associated with using 
external suppliers may result in undesirable outcomes. Hence outsourcing buyer firms 
may find it difficult to achieve their outsourcing goals and maximise returns on 
invested resources. As a result, it is critical for outsourcing buyer firms to reduce the 
level of exposure to the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. This study 
categorises the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships into relational risks and 
performance risks, as conceptualised by Das and Teng (1996). Relational risk focuses 
on the probability and consequences of outsourcing exchange firms not having 
satisfactory cooperation towards a joint goal (Das & Teng, 1996). On the other hand, 
performance risk refers to the probability and consequences of not achieving 
outsourcing objectives, despite satisfactory cooperation between outsourcing 
exchange firms (Das & Teng, 1996). In order to ensure firms’ outsourcing success, 
this study proposes two management approaches to reduce the risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships: the relational approach and the transactional approach.  
 
The relational approach is guided by SET (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Cook, 1977), 
which encourages outsourcing buyer and supplier firms to collaborate and cooperate 
based on shared norms, values and goals to achieve mutual benefits in the exchange 
relationship. Given the mutual benefits and reciprocity that are achieved through 
repeated exchanges, outsourcing exchange firms are required to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness over time. The trustworthiness between outsourcing buyer and 
supplier firms reduces uncooperative behaviours such as opportunism (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995) and allows reciprocity to happen continuously. The benefit of 
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reciprocity is also encapsulated in the cultural concept of guanxi among the Chinese 
communities, which has influenced business relationships in the context of Asia (Lee 
et al., 2010). In addition, it is argued through SET (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Cook, 
1977), outsourcing exchange firms can obtain benefits that would not be achievable 
on their own, by establishing, developing, and growing exchange relationships. This 
study argues that the relational approach is an effective method for managing the 
relational risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. Because the relational risk is 
associated with outsourcing exchange firms not complying with the spirit of 
cooperation, the relational approaches requires exchange firms to collaborate and 
cooperate in order to achieve mutual benefits and to overcome the relational risks 
caused by uncooperative behaviours. 
 
The transactional approach is derived from TCT (Williamson, 1985), which 
emphasises the establishment and utilisation of formal rules and controls to monitor, 
regulate and reward desirable outsourcing performance. The transactional approach 
employs formal contracts as a means to control uncooperative behaviours (relational 
risk), such as opportunism. However, the utilisation of formal contracts may not be 
effective for resolving relational risks, due to the high costs of contractual 
renegotiations and amendments. Furthermore, social scholars such as Gulati (1995a), 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996), and Uzzi (1997) argue that the use of formal contracts has 
a negative effect on cooperation between exchange parties. They assert that a highly-
specified contract signals distrust by exchange parties, which encourages 
opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand, this study argues that the transactional 
approach is a better tool for diminishing performance risks. Performance risk is 
concerned with the possibility and consequences of not achieving outsourcing 
objectives, despite satisfactory cooperation between firms. The transactional approach 
supports the use of formal contracts. A complex formal contract defines the roles and 
responsibilities to be performed and, more importantly, it determines outcomes or 
output to be delivered. The formal contract gives outsourcing buyer firms the abilities 
to penalise and punish outsourcing supplier firms if they fail to achieve the 
outsourcing objective. Therefore, the transactional approach is more likely to be an 
effective management approach to reduce performance risks such as low quality level 
and late delivery, caused by not achieving strategic objectives.  
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3.2 The conceptual model  
 
Two arguments are proposed in Section 3.1, explaining the link between outsourcing 
risks and relationship management approaches. In order to understand this focal 
research issue, this section begins with an examination of the relationship between the 
two dependent variables, relational risk and performance risk. Based on SET and TCT, 
two sets of independent variables are found to be critical to explain the dependent 
variables. A number of hypotheses are developed to illustrate the relations between the 
dependent variables and independent variables.    
  
3.2.1 Relationship between relational risk and performance risk 
 
In the context of offshore outsourcing, the relational risk and performance risk in 
offshore outsourcing relationships can be interconnected. According to TCT 
(Williamson, 1991), outsourcing exchange firms may be required to invest 
relationship-specific assets to support their outsourcing activities, which cannot be 
used or transferred into other applications. Thus the outsourcing buyer firms could 
develop a high level of dependence on the supplier firms, and the outsourcing supplier 
firms could then become opportunistic (relational risk). When the outsourcing 
suppliers are opportunistic, they will limit their efforts toward fulfilling the 
outsourcing objectives, which can be reflected in the form of increase in prices, longer 
lead times and reduction of service levels (performance risk). In this situation, a high 
relational risk can lead to a high performance risk. In addition, difficulty in measuring 
performance may result in incomplete outsourcing contracts, which can cause 
confusion about whether the supplier has fulfilled its obligations and delivered the 
quality level of products and services specified in the contract. Due to differences in 
interpretation of contracts, incompletion of outsourcing contracts can become a source 
of conflicts (relational risk) in outsourcing buyer-supplier relationships. When the 
conflicts between the buyer firm and the supplier firm are high, the outsourcing 
exchange parties tend to lack motivation for achieving outsourcing objectives, which 
may result in a disappointing outsourcing performance (performance risk). In this case, 
a high level of relational risk in offshore outsourcing relationships is associated with a 
high level of performance risk. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 1: Relational risk is positively related to performance risk 
 
3.2.2 Key influencing factors in the management of outsourcing relationship risks 
(independent variables) 
 
The main arguments of this research assume that the relational approach is an 
effective method to minimise relational risk, whereas the transactional approach is 
considered more useful to diminish performance risk. Accordingly, this study 
separates influencing factors into relational factors and transactional factors which are 
illustrated in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Key influencing factors in risk management of outsourcing 
relationships 
 Factors Sources 
R
el
at
io
na
l F
ac
to
rs
 
Trust Mao et al., 2008; Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Heide 
et al., 2007; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Larson, 1992; 
Doney & Cannon, 1997; Parkhe, 1998. 
Commitment Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Heide et al., 2007; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Haried & 
Ramamurthy, 2009; Heide & John, 1992; Henderson, 1990; Cook & Emerson, 
1978. 
Information sharing Mao et al., 2008; Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002; Kern & Blois, 2002; Lee & Kim, 1999; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Oliver, 1990; Han et al., 2008. 
Communication quality Mao et al., 2008; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Lee & Kim, 
1999; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Sarkar et al., 1997; Han et al., 2008. 
Interdependence Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Heide et al., 2007; Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; 
Anderson & Narus, 1990; Herderson, 1990. 
Guanxi Luo, 1997; Yang, 1994; Park & Luo, 2001; Gu et al., 2008; Coleman, 1990. 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
na
l 
Fa
ct
or
s 
Contractual complexity  
 
 
 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Lai, 2009; Barthelemy, 2003b; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 
1995; Li et al., 2008; Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009; Zhang et al., 2003; Cannon 
& Perreault, 1999. 
Asset specificity Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Ellram et al., 2008; 
Haried & Ramamurthy, 2009. 
 
Literature in marketing, sociology and outsourcing management has identified a 
number of factors that indicate a firm’s effort in managing inter-firm relations and 
enhance exchange performance (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Heide & John, 1992; Lee 
& Kim 1999; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Barthelemy, 2003b). This study divides the 
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factors into relational factors 2  (based on the relational approach argument) and 
transactional factors (based on the transactional approach argument). This study has 
selected eight factors (six relational factors and two transactional factors) that are 
considered most relevant to the purpose of this research as shown in Table 3.1. The 
relational factors include trust, commitment, information sharing, communication 
quality, interdependence and guanxi. The transactional factors are contractual 
complexity and asset specificity.  
 
This study argues the relational approach that derives from SET (Homans, 1958; 
Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Blau, 1964) is an effective way to minimise relational risk, 
because this approach is characterised by the relational factors that promote 
cooperation and the joint benefits of exchange relationships. Social scholars claim that 
the relational factors can function as an effective management alternative to the 
transactional approach via formal contracts (Macaulay, 1963; Granovetter 1985; Alder, 
2001). Relational factors such as trust and commitment can align the interests of 
exchange parties and restrict opportunistic behaviour (Heide & John, 1992; Larson, 
1992; Uzzi, 1997; Alder, 2001). Consequently, relational factors may offer an efficient 
way to reduce relational risk caused by uncooperative behaviours like opportunism. In 
addition, it is indicated that relational factors contribute to increased performance 
(Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995; Bello & Gilliland, 1997; Skarmeas & Katsikeas, 
2001). Larson (1994) found that the level of buyer-supplier cooperation is positively 
related to product quality and lower transaction costs. Therefore, the cooperation 
promoted by relational factors encourages outsourcing buyer and supplier firms to 
work towards mutual goals and thus achieve the joint benefits of exchange 
relationships, which reduces performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
 
This study also argues the transactional approach grounded in TCT (Williamson, 1975; 
1981; 1985), serves as an efficient response to safeguard performance risk, because 
this approach is characterised by transactional factors that specify clear rules and 
guidelines to monitor, control, and assess the partner’s behaviours, and also determine 
the outcomes to be delivered. When outsourcing supplier firms fail to deliver expected 
                                                        
2 There are many other relational factors indicated in the literature. Examples are joint action, risks and 
benefits sharing, and cooperation. This study acknowledges there are other relational factors, but the six 
relational factors chosen are the most relevant factors to this study.  
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performance such as quality and quantity, transactional factors can provide useful 
procedures for resolving unforeseen disputes. Consequently, transactional factors are 
beneficial for reducing performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. In 
contrast, transactional factors may not be successful at reducing relational risk, due to 
dissatisfaction with the cooperation between exchange parties. Social theorists such as 
Gulaiti (1995) and Uzzi (1997) assert that cooperation among exchange parties cannot 
be regulated by formal rules and procedures since it is embedded in exchange 
relationships. In addition, transactional factors emphasise that the rational, calculative 
nature of the exchange relationship can discourage the formation of cooperative 
behaviours between exchange parties (Macaulay, 1963; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). 
Berheim and Whinston (1998) contend that highly complex formal contracts could 
encourage opportunistic behaviour regarding actions that cannot be specified within 
contracts. Consequently, transactional factors may cause relational risk in outsourcing 
relationships to escalate. Therefore, these arguments lead to the development of the 
hypotheses below: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Relational factors are negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3: Relational factors are negatively related to the performance risk. 
Hypothesis 4: Transactional factors are negatively related to the performance risk. 
Hypothesis 5: Transactional factors are positively related to the relational risk. 
 
3.2.2.1 Trust 
 
According to SET, trust is regarded as one of the key social components in developing 
successful inter-firm relationships (Mogan & Hunt, 1994; Alder, 2001). Empirical 
research has revealed that trust can improve inter-firm exchanges (Heide & John, 
1990, 1992; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). However, a 
significant number of debates exist about the mechanism behind trust. Economists 
tend to emphasise the rational and calculative origin of trust. Williamson (1993) 
claims that the term trust is misleading. In contrast, sociologists such as Uzzi (1997) 
argue that trust is embedded in social relationship exchanges. When one party trusts 
the other, there is little need to control all circumstances through complex contracts, 
and thus transaction costs are reduced by removal of costly contractual renegotiation 
and amendments (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Zhang et al (2003:554) defines trust 
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as “the confidence that exchange partners have for each other’s reliability and 
integrity”.  
 
This study acknowledges that the term trust is a complex and multidimensional 
concept, and agrees with the definition of Zhang et al (2003), which captures the 
behavioural dimension of trust that is particularly important to the management of 
outsourcing exchange relationships.  
 
Trust is an important factor of the outsourcing relational approach, because trust 
provides a context in which partners share critical information and exert efforts to 
achieve individual and joint goals (Anderson & Narus, 1990). In the context of 
offshore outsourcing, the outsourcing buyer firms are challenged by huge 
geographical distances, and they have to trust that their counterpart is acting in ways 
beneficial to the relationship. Anderson and Narus (1990) asserts that once trust is 
formed, exchange firms will discover that joint efforts lead to outcomes that exceed 
what one party would achieve solely in its own interests. Additionally, Parkhe (1998) 
claims a mutual trust between exchange parties may weaken the need to control all 
circumstances through formal contracts and thus deter opportunistic behaviours. In 
other words, when the outsourcing buyer firms believe that their suppliers will replace 
short-term opportunistic behaviour with long-term shared values, the buyer firms will 
pay less attention to cooperation and thereby lower the perceived level of relational 
risk. Furthermore, when mutual trust reduces the monitoring efforts of outsourcing 
buyer firms, the buyer firms may concentrate more of their efforts towards their 
suppliers on activities that enhance performance. Therefore, a high level of trust 
between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms reduces the perceived level of 
performance risk. These arguments are formalised in the hypotheses below:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Trust is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3a: Trust is negatively related to the performance risk. 
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3.2.2.2 Commitment  
 
Commitment is viewed as a crucial relational component in building long-term 
business relationships (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Lee & Kim, 
1999; Lee 2001). Drawing on the relational perspective (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; 
Han et al, 2008; Kwon, 2008), when outsourcing buyer and supplier firms are 
committed to a relationship, they should demonstrate a willingness to make short-term 
sacrifices, with the aim of maintaining a long-term relationship. A high level of 
commitment encourages outsourcing buyer and supplier firms to interact beyond what 
is defined in formal contracts, and thus encourages cooperative behaviours. 
Additionally, a mutual commitment promotes exchange parties to achieve individual 
and joint goals without raising the presence of opportunistic behaviours (Cumming, 
1984). Therefore, a high level of commitment is likely to reduce relational risk in 
offshore outsourcing relationships. The definition of commitment implies future 
orientation in which outsourcing buyer and supplier firms are willing to build and 
sustain long-term relationships that can resolve unforeseen disturbances. Furthermore, 
when outsourcing buyer and supplier firms are highly committed to a relationship, 
they will utilise maximum efforts to achieve joint goals. Consequently, highly 
committed outsourcing exchange relationships will lower the perception of 
performance risk caused by issues such as low quality level, late delivery and longer 
lead time. The above arguments support the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Commitment is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3b: Commitment is negatively related to the performance risk. 
 
3.2.2.3 Information sharing 
 
Information sharing is defined as a bilateral expectation that exchange parties will 
proactively provide critical and proprietary information to each other (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Zhang et al., 2003). Lee (2001) found a more frequent and relevant 
exchange of information leads to closer relationships. Haried and Ramamurthy (2009) 
assert that effective information sharing has the ability to foster commitment, instil 
trust, and rapidly resolve any conflicts as they emerge. It is argued that trust and 
commitment discourages opportunistic behaviours and prevents conflicts between 
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partners (Heide & John, 1994; Adler, 2001). As a result, a high level of information 
exchange can reduce the perception of relational risk that is caused by opportunism 
and relationship conflicts. In addition, information sharing allows outsourcing buyer 
and supplier firms to assign and complete tasks more efficiently, which leads to a 
more satisfying cooperation between the buyer and supplier firms. Consequently, 
cooperation encourages outsourcing buyer and supplier firms to work towards mutual 
goals, with the intention of achieving the joint benefits of the exchange relationship, 
which reduces performance risk due to non-accomplishment of outsourcing objectives. 
These arguments lead to the development of the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Information sharing is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3c: Information sharing is negatively related to the performance risk. 
 
3.2.2.4 Communication quality 
 
According to the social exchange literature (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), effective 
communication between partners is essential in order to achieve the intended 
objective (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Communication quality involves sharing 
significant and meaningful information in both informal and formal situations that are 
accurate, timeless, adequate, and credible (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994). In the context of offshore outsourcing, timely, accurate, and relevant 
communication between buyer firms and supplier firms allows exchange firms to be 
better informed of each other’s progress and development. Consequently, quality 
communication facilitates a better understanding and improves the confidence of 
collaboration between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms, which in turn enhances 
mutual commitment and trust between exchange firms. It is confirmed by Sarkar et al., 
(1997) that communication quality is associated with a mutual trust and commitment 
and this mutual trust and commitment deters opportunistic behaviours (Cumming, 
1984; Heide & John, 1992; Parkhe, 1998). Furthermore, it is evident that a high level 
of communication exerts a positive impact on relationship satisfaction between 
exchange parties (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Therefore, communication quality can 
reduce relational risk caused by dissatisfaction in exchange relationships. When 
outsourcing buyer and supplier firms are communicating in an accurate, timely and 
relevant manner, the misunderstandings and flawed expectations caused by 
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miscommunication diminish, which helps outsourcing buyer firms to reduce  
transaction costs and thus better manage the performance risk in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. Based on the above arguments, it is hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 2d: Communication quality is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3d: Communication quality is negatively related to the performance risk. 
 
3.2.2.5 Interdependence 
 
Interdependence derives from the social exchange perspective, which requires 
members of exchange relationships to join forces to achieve mutually beneficial goals 
(Homan, 1958; Blau, 1964; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978). In the context of offshore 
outsourcing, when buyer and supplier firms are working towards mutual goals, the 
benefits of exchange relationships will be greater than either firm could achieve in 
isolation. Thus, the interdependence between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms 
will be motivated to maintain the relationship since any loss of autonomy will be 
equally compensated through mutual gains. Consequently, the interdependence of 
outsourcing exchange parties creates an increased willingness for closer cooperation 
and stronger outsourcing buyer supplier relationships, which in turn reduces relational 
risk caused by unsatisfactory cooperation, such as opportunism. In contrast, 
interdependence requires members of exchange relationships to rely on each other to 
achieve mutual benefits from joint goals. If one of the members fails to embrace the 
spirit of the exchange relationship, the failure of the relationship will be directly 
translated into an escalation of transaction costs. Therefore, outsourcing buyer and 
supplier firms will be more likely to maximise the benefits of the exchange 
relationship and minimise the mutually-imposed costs of termination. As a result, 
interdependence between outsourcing exchange parties diminishes performance risk 
due to unachieved outsourcing objectives. The above arguments are demonstrated in 
the hypotheses below: 
 
Hypothesis 2e: Interdependence is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3e: Interdependence is negatively related to the performance risk. 
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3.2.2.6 Guanxi 
 
The word guanxi is translated as relationship (Hwang, 1987). It is embedded in every 
part of social life in China and is considered to be a specific mechanism of Chinese 
social governance (Park & Luo, 2001). Guanxi refers to relationships or social 
connections that bond exchange parties through the reciprocal exchange of favours to 
obtain resources (Gu et al., 2008). At a firm level, guanxi builds trust and facilitates 
the exchange of favours for organisational purposes (Gu et al., 2008). In addition, a 
good personal relationship with Chinese supplier firms would assist the flow of 
quality communication and information exchange, and thus encourages better 
cooperation between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms. Consequently, when the 
buyer firm is involved in a close guanxi with the supplier firm, the buyer firm would 
believe that the supplier firm intends to develop a long-term relationship that will 
achieve mutual benefits in the future. Coleman (1990) contends the norms of 
reciprocity in guanxi establish a social constraint that prevents exchange parties from 
self-seeking opportunism. Therefore, guanxi may reduce the relational risk perceived 
by outsourcing buyer firms. Park and Luo (2001) found that the development of a 
guanxi relationship leads to lower transaction costs and higher firm performance. 
Consequently, establishing a guanxi relationship can reduce the performance risk 
caused by not achieving outsourcing objectives. This leads to the development of the 
hypotheses below:  
 
Hypothesis 2f: Guanxi is negatively related to the relational risk. 
Hypothesis 3f: Guanxi is negatively related to the performance risk. 
 
3.2.2.7 Contractual complexity 
 
A complex contract carefully defines the roles and responsibilities to be performed, 
and specifies procedures for non-compliance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In the context 
of offshore outsourcing, when an outsourcing supplier firm fails to achieve the 
expected quality level or perform delivery on time, a buyer firm has the ability to 
resolve these non-performance issues by including stringent rules and conditions in 
the contract and applying penalties to mitigate such risks. In addition, when problems 
arise due to unforeseeable changes, outsourcing buyer firms can add clauses and 
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procedures that facilitate negotiations. Thus, a complex contractual agreement serves 
as an effective mechanism for resolving performance risks such as late delivery time, 
low product quality and escalating costs of outsourcing activities. According to 
transactional cost theory, a complex contract enhances an outsourcing buyer firm’s 
ability to detect suppliers’ opportunism and also offers the buyer firm appropriate 
controls to mitigate the opportunistic behaviours of suppliers. However, empirical 
evidence suggests an opposing outcome. Murry and Heide (1998) find a formal 
control through the use of complex contracts undermines the cooperation of exchange 
relationships. It is evident that a complex contract may signal distrust and create 
defensive attitudes and behaviours of the exchange partners that are characteristically 
opportunistic in nature (Deci et al., 1999). Therefore, a high level of contractual 
complexity is likely to encourage relational risk in outsourcing relationships. This 
leads to the development of hypotheses below:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Contractual complexity is negatively related to the performance risk. 
Hypothesis 5a: Contractual complexity is positively related to the relational risk. 
 
3.2.2.8 Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity requires specific assets that are specialised and unique to support a 
particular activity (Williamson, 1983). Highly asset-specific investments in the forms 
of human assets, physical assets, and company-specific routines create great costs that 
may not be re-deployable to other activities. In the context of offshore outsourcing 
relationships, both buyer firms and supplier firms are expected to interact, which 
forms some kind of dependence caused by relationship-specific assets. Relationship-
specific assets build on a substantial exchange of information, joint adaptations to 
each other’s business routines and work flows. Since a high level of relationship-
specific asset investments impose mutually high costs of termination, outsourcing 
exchange firms tend to safeguard these investments. Hence outsourcing firms are 
likely to work towards a mutual objective that may increase performance. In contrast, 
when the level of relationship-specific assets increases, the outsourcing buyer firm 
could develop a high level of dependence on the supplier. The dependence on the 
supplier may encourage the supplier to behave opportunistically and be less motivated 
to resolve differences relating to cooperation. Therefore, a high level of asset 
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specificity tends to increase the relational risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
Following on from the above arguments, hypotheses are formed as below: 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Asset specificity is negatively related to the performance risk. 
Hypothesis 5b: Asset specificity is positively related to the relational risk. 
 
 3.2.2.9 The indirect effect of relational risk  
 
Social scholars argue that relational factors promote cooperation and the joint benefits 
of exchange relationships (Homans, 1958; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Blau, 1964). The 
cooperation promoted by relational factors encourages outsourcing buyer and supplier 
firms to work towards mutual goals, which in turn increase outsourcing performance. 
It is well-grounded in social exchange theory that the use of relational factors 
contributes to increased performance (Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995; Bello & 
Gilliland, 1997; Skarmeas & Katsikeas, 2001). For example, Larson (1994) found that 
the level of buyer-supplier cooperation is positively related to product quality and 
lower transaction costs. Consequently, it is established that social factors can reduce 
the performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships.  
 
Social scholars also argue that relational factors such as trust and commitment 
discourage opportunistic behaviour (Heide & John, 1992; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997; 
Alder, 2001). Consequently, relational factors can reduce relational risk caused by 
uncooperative behaviours, such as opportunism.  
 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 1 argues that when the outsourcing suppliers are 
opportunistic, they will limit their efforts toward fulfilling the outsourcing objectives, 
which can be reflected in forms of increasing prices, longer lead time and reducing 
product quality. Thus, a high level of relational risk can lead to a high level of 
performance risk. 
 
The above arguments can be understood as relational factors facilitating a cooperative 
relationship between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms, which reduce 
opportunistic behaviours (relational factors lower the relational risk). In addition, the 
cooperation between outsourcing buyer and supplier firms allows the two parties to 
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work towards mutual outsourcing objectives (relational factors lower performance 
risk). Furthermore, a higher relational risk can result in a higher performance risk. 
Therefore, it is logical to assume relational risk may have an indirect effect on the 
relationship between relational factors and performance risk. In order to determine the 
indirect effect of relational risk, this study hypothesises as below: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Relational risk indirectly affects the relationship between relational 
factors and performance risk. 
Hypothesis 6a: Relational risk moderates the relationship between relational factors 
and performance risk. 
Hypothesis 6b: Relational risk mediates the relationship between relational factors 
and performance risk. 
 
3.2.3 Control variable (cultural difference) 
 
Cultural differences such as language, values and attitude play a powerful role when 
firms outsource offshore. Cultural differences can create difficulties and cause 
misunderstandings between outsourcing supplier and buyer firms. Differences in 
management styles, problem resolution practices and work ethics are shaped by an 
outsourcing firm’s national culture. It has also been found that exchange parties with 
similar national cultures indicated greater levels of trust and commitment with each 
other than parties with dissimilar national cultures (Mehta et al., 2006). Therefore, 
cultural difference can influence the perception of outsourcing risks and thus it should 
be controlled for.  
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3.4 The conceptual model 
 
The conceptual model of this study is presented as below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The conceptual model 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, a conceptual model has been developed to examine the interactions 
between management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. The 
model incorporates a theoretical understanding from the risk perspective, relational 
perspective, and transaction cost perspective. The dependent variables of this study 
are relational risk and performance risk. The independent variables are separated into 
relational factors (based on the understanding of relational perspective) and 
transactional factors (based on the understanding of transactional cost perspective). 
The relational factors include trust, commitment, information sharing, communication 
quality, interdependence and guanxi. The transactional factors include contract 
complexity and asset specificity. The control variable considered in this study is 
cultural difference. Chapter 4 of this study describes the methodology used to collect 
data.  
Relational Factors 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
The previous chapter discussed the development of a conceptual model and the 
pertinent hypotheses. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the method used to 
measure and validate the role of different management approaches on the risks of 
offshore outsourcing relationships. This chapter will first present the justification for 
choosing a quantitative research methodology. It is followed by detailed descriptions 
of survey design, data collection process, and survey instrument. Finally, this chapter 
addresses the validity issue, statistical method, and ethical issues.  
 
4.1 Justification of methodology used 
 
Quantitative research method reflects the positivist paradigm, which is most useful in 
testing theories (Creswell, 2009). The main goals of quantitative research are to make 
accurate predictions about the relationships pertaining to a specific phenomena, 
gaining meaningful insights of the phenomena, validating the relationships and testing 
theories and models that explains the relationships between the phenomena (Hair et al., 
2009). A quantitative research method allows researchers to develop and employ 
model and pertinent hypotheses to test existing theories. The utilisation of numerical 
data and statistics collected from participants provides researchers with exact and 
quantifiable answers to prove or refute the hypotheses pertaining to the phenomena 
(Creswell, 2009). The quantitative research technique is found to be most appropriate 
for this study because it permits the researcher to obtain accurate results about the 
research problem, which intend to examine the relationships between management 
approaches and the risks of offshore outsourcing relationships, by testing and 
validating hypotheses derived from it. 
 
A conceptual model is presented in Chapter 3, drawing on social exchange perspective, 
transaction cost perspective, and risk management literature to investigate the research 
problem. In order to gain a better understanding of managing risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships in this study, it is important to test and establish 
relationships in the conceptual model. As applied to this study, the quantitative 
research method enables the researcher to employ statistical analysis of data to 
confirm or disconfirm the research assumptions (Creswell, 2009). In addition, the 
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quantitative approach allows the researcher to identify the best predicting factors on 
risks in outsourcing relationships.  
 
4.2 Research design 
 
A quantitative research design, using an online survey to collect data, was used as the 
preferred research technique. A survey design is a research procedure, which involves 
investigators distributing questionnaires to a sample of a particular population and 
generalising a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, behaviours or 
opinions from analysis of that particular population (Creswell, 2009). In the present 
case, the purpose of this survey study is to test the interaction between management 
approaches and outsourcing risks among New Zealand and Australian manufacturing 
firms that outsource to China, because there are fewer research-represented 
perspectives from New Zealand and Australian outsourcing firms. The dependent 
variables are the risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, which categorise into 
relational risk and performance risk as conceptualised by Das and Teng (1996). 
Relational risk is defined as the probability and consequences of outsourcing 
exchange firms not having satisfactory cooperation towards a joint goal (Das & Teng, 
1996). Performance risk refers to the possibility and the consequence that the strategic 
objectives of outsourcing exchange firms are not successfully achieved, despite an 
adequate cooperation (Das & Teng, 1996).  
 
In Chapter 2, two management approaches (the relational approach and the 
transactional approach) were proposed to minimise the risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. The independent variables were developed based on an understanding 
of the two management approaches. The relational approach guided by SET regards 
the development of outsourcing relationships as a dynamic process through specific 
sequential interactions in which exchange parties are expected to understand their 
responsibilities and are willing to perform actions that result in positive outcomes 
(Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985). The factors related to relational approach were trust, 
commitment, information sharing, communication quality, interdependence, and 
guanxi. On the other hand, the transactional approach grounded by TCT is an effective 
tool for minimising risks related to performance, as it is characterised by transactional 
factors that specify clear rules and guidelines to monitor, control, and assess the 
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partner’s behaviours, and also determines the outcomes to be delivered. When 
outsourcing supplier firms fail to deliver expected performance such as quality and 
quantity, transactional factors can provide useful procedures for resolving unforeseen 
disputes and in turn achieve outsourcing objectives. The transactional factors selected 
for this study are contractual complexity and assets specificity.  
 
Cultural difference was added as the control for possible influence on the dependent 
variables. Culture difference can create difficulties and cause misunderstandings 
between outsourcing supplier and buyer firms if cultural factors such as language, 
values, and attitude are mismanaged during outsourcing relationship development 
(Mehta et al., 2006). The effect of cultural difference playing a contributing role to 
outsourcing supplier risks was, therefore, investigated. 
 
4.3 Survey research 
 
This study employed a survey research method using an online questionnaire to 
collect data from outsourcing managers of New Zealand and Australia. The online 
questionnaire approach is considered one the most efficient ways of collecting 
primary data (Bryman & Bell, 2003). This approach invites prospective respondents 
to visit a website at which the questionnaire can be found and complete it online 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). There are several advantages associated with using online 
questionnaires. Firstly, the administrative cost of online questionnaires is much 
cheaper for researchers than mail questionnaires as costs of postage, paper, and 
envelope are saved. Secondly, online questionnaires allow a faster response time since 
mail questionnaires would take a longer delivery time. Thirdly, online questionnaires 
save respondents valuable time by making it easy to select choices in drop down 
menus and adding automatic skipping functions (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Finally, 
respondents’ answers can be automatically stored in a database, thus eliminating data 
entry time and errors. It is also acknowledged in literature that using online 
questionnaires may have some problems such as low response rates, restricted online 
population, multiple replies, and confidentiality and anonymity issues (Hair et al., 
2009; Bryman & Bell, 2003). However, using online questionnaires in this study 
provided the researcher with efficiencies such as faster response time, lower 
administrative costs, and easy comparison and analysis of data. Thus, the online 
Yiying (Cindy) Zhang_Master of Commerce and Administration _School of Marketing and International Business 
 
47 
 
questionnaire is a versatile, economical and efficient research tool for gathering data 
for this research.  
 
4.3.1 Sampling and data collection 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between firms’ management 
approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. Thus it is important to gain 
understanding how outsourcing risks can be managed through relational factors and 
transactional factors on a firm level. Thus the unit of analysis is the firm.  
 
This research focuses on New Zealand and Australian firms which outsource 
manufacturing activities to China. A large number of empirical studies of offshore 
outsourcing have concentrated on the information service sector and took place in the 
United State of America (USA) and Europe (EU) since there is a larger pool of 
outsourcing firms located in the USA and EU (Grover etl., 1996; Barthelemy, 2003a, 
b; Gregorio et al., 2009). In comparison, fewer empirical researches on offshore 
outsourcing to China have taken place in New Zealand and Australia. It is useful to 
extend the existing research context by examining risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships from New Zealand and Australian perspectives. This study also chooses 
to focus on China as a study context as China is one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world (Buckley, 2007) and also an important trading destination for Australian 
and New Zealand outsourcing firms (Australian Department of Affairs and Trade, 
2010; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). Thus, this study can 
provide useful insights for Australian and New Zealand outsourcing firms into how to 
manage risks in offshore outsourcing relationship with China.  
 
New Zealand and Australian outsourcing firms were searched in the Kompass 
database, New Zealand Export Directory, the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
(NZTE) website and international databases such as Dun & Bradstreet. The databases 
contained a large number of manufacturing firms. However, the number of firms that 
perform outsourcing to China was unable to be established. In the end, this study 
chose to use the data from Dun & Bradstreet, because it is a Fortune 500 company, 
with access to information about more than 140 million companies worldwide (Dun & 
Bradstreet, 2010). In order to narrow down the search of outsourcing firms, this study 
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employed the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC), which is developed by the New Zealand and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics to improve the ability of industry statistics to be compared between the two 
countries and with the rest of the world (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). The ANZSIC 
was also employed to classify companies in the database of Dun & Bradstreet. A total 
of 433 firms were randomly selected in the categories of manufacturing including 
apparel and other unfinished products, textile mill products, leather products and other 
textile products, comprising of 322 Australian firms and 111 New Zealand firms. 
 
 In order to fulfil the research objective, an investigation of the behaviour and 
experience of outsourcing managers was required. This study adopted a systematic 
random sampling approach that allows sample elements to be selected extremely 
precisely, making it easier to guarantee respect for criteria such as homogeneity 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). The sample of 322 Australian firms and 111 New Zealand 
firms was drawn from 15 percent of a total target population of 2146 Australian and 
740 New Zealand firms using ANZSIC industry classification. In the case of this 
study, the systematic sampling method provides a relatively easy way to draw a 
sample while ensuring randomness (Hair et al., 2009). The sample of 322 Australian 
and 111 New Zealand manufacturing firms was then investigated through websites 
and telephone communication to determine whether they perform outsourcing 
functions to China. Within the sample, 117 (56 Australian firms and 61 New Zealand 
firms) firms were found to conduct outsourcing activities to China. Thus, the online 
survey was sent to senior managers of those 117 manufacturing firms inviting them to 
participate. Forty-eight responses (25 New Zealand firms and 23 Australian firms) 
were received over the period of October and November (41 percent response rate). 
From those, the results of 41 completed responses were analysed for the purpose of 
this study.   
 
4.3.2 Instrumentation  
 
The data was collected through the application of an observation technique involving 
a structured survey. An observation technique is used to collect primary data about 
human behaviours and marketing phenomena, which enables researchers to capture 
the real behaviours of an individual in a natural setting (Hair et al., 2009). In addition, 
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this technique reduces recall error and response bias, and observer errors (Hair et al., 
2009). More importantly, data can be collected in less time and at a lower cost. 
Therefore, the observation technique is an appropriate method to use. The survey of 
this study used the existing measures from previous validated empirical researches, as 
well as developing new measures based on interpretation of the constructs from the 
outsourcing literature (see Table 4.1). This study’s initial survey was designed in a 
text format prior to Human Ethics Consent approval of online applications. Later, the 
survey was transformed into an online questionnaire using Qualtrics. Qualtrics is web-
based survey software that allows researchers to build, distribute and analyse surveys.  
 
A critical stage in the use of survey-based research is the design of the survey (Fowler, 
1993). After thorough examinations of extant outsourcing literature, the survey 
developed 28 questions, which were grouped into six sections in order to examine the 
interaction between management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships (see Appendix D).  
 
Section 1 was comprised of five questions that focused on general company 
information, including headquarters location, year of establishment, foreign 
ownership, operating industry, and annual sales revenue.  
 
Section 2 was comprised of eight questions that were designed to determine how 
much outsourcing experience companies have internationally. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their firms’ outsourcing experience, main outsourcing activity, 
percentage of outsourcing, those countries most important to their companies and the 
main reasons for conducting outsourcing offshore.  
 
Section 3 included six questions relating to companies’ outsourcing experience to 
China, since China is the main focus of this study. Respondents were asked to indicate 
the number of years that their companies have been involved in outsourcing to China, 
the number of suppliers and intermediate parties involved in outsourcing activities, 
and cultural differences they experienced during outsourcing to China in terms of 
culture, religion, people’s thinking, business practices, language, and macro-
environment, which were obtained from Lee & Kim (1999), Tihanyi et al., (2005), 
Mao et al., (2008). The main purpose of this section was to determine the experience 
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that outsourcing companies had in China. Thus, the background information about 
outsourcing to China in Section 3 facilitated an understanding of the companies’ 
overall relationship building approaches in China.  
 
Section 4 of the survey comprised of 26 statements concerned with companies’ 
outsourcing relations with Chinese suppliers. Based on social exchange theory, six 
relational factors were developed including trust, commitment, information exchange, 
communication quality, interdependence and guanxi. The measurement items were 
extracted from the existing literature. As illustrated in Table 4.1, four items were used 
to measure trust and guanxi, whereas three items were employed to examine 
commitment, information sharing, communication quality and interdependence.  The 
transactional factors derived from transaction cost theory and comprised of 
contractual complexity and asset specificity, which were measured based on three 
items.  
 
Table 4.1: Measurement items 
 
Constructs and measures Source 
Trust (TR)  
TR1: We trust that this supplier makes beneficial decisions for us under 
any circumstances. 
TR2: This supplier is willing to provide assistance to us without 
exception. 
TR3: We are generally sceptical of the information provided to us by this 
foreign supplier. 
TR4: Without monitoring, this foreign supplier would fulfil his 
obligations. 
Lee&Kim, 1999;  
Han et al., 2008;  
Li et al., 2008 
Commitment (CM)  
CM1: We and this supplier are willing to devote all resources needed for 
the relationship. 
CM2: We would not drop this supplier even if another supplier offers us 
better terms. 
CM3: We are fully committed to helping this supplier in the long term. 
Lai, 2009;  
Heide et al. 2007 
Information sharing (IS)  
IS1: We share mutual information with this supplier regarding the 
business environment and technical change that affects each 
other’s businesses. 
IS2: We mutually share proprietary information with this supplier. 
IS3: We only provide information to this supplier according to a pre-
specified agreement. 
Mohr&Spekman, 
1994; 
Lee&Kim, 2005 
Communication quality (CQ)  
CQ1: This supplier lets us know as soon as possible about any unexpected 
problems. 
CQ2: The communication between us and this supplier is complete and 
Anderson&Narus, 
1990;  
Mao et al., 2008 
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thorough. 
CQ3: There is no language barrier between us and this supplier. 
Interdependence (ID)  
ID1: We have made significant investments for this supplier (e.g. 
upgraded production systems). 
ID2: If we wanted to, we could switch to another supplier quite easily. 
ID3: If this supplier wanted to, they could easily switch to another client. 
Mohr&Spekman, 
1994;  
Heide et al., 2007 
Guanxi (GX)  
GX1: Our senior manager has extensive personal relationships with this 
supplier. 
GX2: Based upon our senior manager’s personal relationship with this 
supplier, our company was able to gain privileges.   
GX3: Our senior manager was able to obtain valuable and important 
information based on his/her personal relationship with this 
supplier. 
GX4: When problem arises, our senior manager contacts this supplier for 
resolutions based on their personal relationship. 
Su et al., 2009;  
Lee&Dawn, 2005 
Contractual  complexity (CC)  
CC1: Our outsourcing contract with this supplier is highly customised and 
required considerable legal work. 
CC2: We believe a detailed contract is the most important tool for 
regulating the behaviour of this supplier. 
CC3: When it comes to disputes and arbitration concerning the products 
and services with this supplier, we always follow the terms of the 
contract 
Poppo&Zenger, 2002;  
Lai, 2009;  
Heide et al., 2007 
Asset specificity (AS)  
AP1: Our company-specific routines and workflows are customised to 
this supplier. 
AP2: We invested a significant amount of time in developing the skill 
level of our employees to suit this supplier. 
AP3: It’s very costly for us to switch from this supplier. 
Poppo&Zenger, 2002;  
Zaheer&Venkatraman, 
1995 
Relational risk (RR)  
RR1: The probability of this supplier acting opportunistically is high. 
RR2: The potential for conflicts regarding the way we do business with 
this supplier is high. 
RR3: The likelihood of this supplier acquiring useful technological 
information from us for their own benefit is high. 
Cavusgil et al., 2004;  
Herath&Kishore, 
2009; Aron et al., 
2005; 
Dhar&Balakrishnan, 
2006  
Performance risk (PR)  
PR1: The likelihood of unexpected costs in this working relationship is 
high. 
PR2: This supplier has a tendency of requiring longer lead time than 
others in the past. 
PR3: This supplier has a tendency of late delivery issues in the past. 
PR4: This supplier has a tendency of quality issues in the past. 
PR5: Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about 
project scope. 
PR6: Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about the 
project compliance. 
PR7: Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about 
penalty clauses. 
 
Barthelemy, 2003a;  
Aron et al., 2005; 
Dhar&Balakrishnan, 
2006;  
Ellram et al., 2008;  
Li & Barnes, 2008;  
Herath&Kishore, 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 5 included ten statements, which were designed to understand an outsourcing 
manager’s perception of the probability of outsourcing supplier risk occurring in the 
future. The related measurement items are illustrated in Table 4.1. The outsourcing 
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supplier risk was divided into factors concerning relational risk and performance risk. 
The measurement items were developed based on careful investigation of risk factors 
within extant outsourcing literature. The relational risk was measured in three items; 
whereas seven items were used to measure the performance risk. In addition, 
particular attention was paid to the wording of the items used to measure outsourcing 
supplier risks, as the definition of relational risk and performance risk reflected the 
outsourcing manager’s future prediction based on current experience.  
 
The last section of the survey had six questions, which required information regarding 
respondents’ current position, job title, gender, working experience and their 
involvement in outsourcing decisions. In addition, a text box was also provided for 
any other comments respondents wished to make.   
 
This online questionnaire used a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 as 
‘Completely disagree’ to 7 as ‘Completely agree’ in Sections 4 and 5. The Likert 
scaling provided a simple and effective means of quantifying the data and obtaining a 
summated value (Alreck & Settle, 1995). To ensure the accuracy of constructs 
measurement, the formulations of measurement items in the outsourcing relations 
section were adopted from previously-tested empirical research, including Anderson 
and Narus (1990), Mohr and Spekman (1994), Poppo and Zenger (2002), Lai (2009), 
Lee and Kim (1999, 2005). The measurements of dependent variables were 
formulated based on the conceptual understanding of the Das and Teng (1996) paper, 
as well as careful examination of risk factors within extant outsourcing literature 
(refer to Table 4.1). 
 
Testing and improving the survey was achieved through three stages. In the initial 
stage, the text-formatted survey was tested by a number of academic peers within the 
school. The peers, including members of academic staff and fellow PhD students, 
were asked to comment on clarity, relevance, specificity and readability of the survey. 
Several improvements to the relevance of the questions and the clarity of the contents 
were made during numerous discussions with the academic peers. In the second stage, 
the text-formatted survey was transformed into an online survey and was then sent to 
non-academics, such as friends and family, for testing usability and functionality. 
Several other improvements were made to the skip function of the online survey. In 
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the final stage, the online survey was emailed to three New Zealand outsourcing 
managers for pre-test purposes. Based on their experiences, corrections were made to 
the contents and language of the survey.       
 
4.4 Validity and reliability of the measurement instrument 
 
In social science it is argued that measurement can be defined as the process that 
enables researchers to establish a relationship between abstract concepts and empirical 
indicators (Camines and Zeller, 1990). It is crucial for researchers to ensure the data 
they plan to collect in the field relates as closely as possible to the reality they hope to 
study. Thus, empirical studies need to take into account whether measurements are 
valid and reliable.  
 
Reliability is concerned with the extent to which a measuring instrument offers 
consistent results on a repeated basis across time, which is particularly at issue in 
connection with quantitative research (Hair et al., 2009). Internal consistency method 
was developed to measure reliability, which relies on Cronbach’s alpha (Thietart et al., 
2001). Thus, Cronbach’s alpha test (Cronbach, 2004) was calculated to assess the 
reliability of each construct in SPSS reliability programme. According to Hair, Bush, 
and Ortinau (2009), the Cronbach’s alpha value may range from 0 to 1, and a value of 
less than 0.6 would typically indicate a satisfactory internal consistency. The alpha 
scores for each construct fall above the accepted threshold of 0.6. As reported in Table 
4.2, all measurement items of variables have achieved an accepted level. 
 
Table 4.2: Results of Cronbach’s alpha test  
 
Variables Number of items Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) 
1.Trust 4 .702 
2.Commitment 3 .886 
3.Information sharing 3 .788 
4.Communication quality 3 .709 
5.Interdependence 3 .695 
6.Guanxi 4 .736 
7.Contractual complexity 3 .771 
8.Asset specificity 3 .725 
9.Relational risk 3 .707 
10.Performance risk 7 .689 
11.Culture difference 16 .834 
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Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a 
piece of research (Bryman & Bell, 2003). This study assessed construct, content, as 
well as external validity.  
 
The construct validity refers to the extent to which the variables under investigation 
are completely and accurately identified before any relationship was hypothesised 
(Hair et al., 2009: 283). This study addressed this validity by adopting constructs from 
empirical research that had been already used and validated by other scholars (see 
Table 4.1), except the items of the dependent variables. On the other hand, the 
constructs of the two dependent variables were developed based on careful 
examination of risk factors within extant outsourcing literature (also refer to Table 
4.1). Therefore, the construct validity of this study is assured by empirical and 
theoretical support.  
 
Content validity is sometimes referred to as face validity, which examines how well a 
construct’s measurable components represent that construct (Hair et al., 2009: 337). 
The measurement items of the survey instrument were drawn up through a thorough 
examination of the offshore outsourcing domain. The content validity of the survey 
instrument was reviewed by a panel of academic peers for possible improvements to 
the measurement items of the survey, and non-academic respondents were employed 
in a pilot test for feedback on the clarity of the survey questions and contents.  
 
4.5 Statistical method 
  
The response data was analysed using SPSS version 18, which allowed this study to 
examine the links between management approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. The statistical methods used in this research range from basic 
techniques, such as calculating descriptive and frequency statistics, to more advanced 
techniques, such as regression analysis. The descriptive and frequency statistics are 
useful procedures for describing and summarising information about variables (Field, 
2005). A correlation analysis is used to measure the degree of a supposed linear 
association between two or more variables (Field, 2005). This study employed the 
Pearson’s correlation to access association between two interval variables. A 
regression analysis is a technique used for discovering the best linear prediction of a 
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dependent variable from a set of predictor variables (Bryman & Bell, 2003). This 
study employed a multiple regression analysis to test hypotheses proposed in Chapter 
3. This procedure allows the researcher to examine the effects of relational factors and 
transactional factors (independent variables) on relational risk and performance risk 
(dependent variables) and obtain the statistical significance of the coefficients 
corresponding to the hypotheses. In addition, this study used data analysis procedures 
developed by Baron and Kenney (1986) to determine the moderating and mediating 
effects of relation risk on interactions between relational factors and performance risk.  
 
4.6 Ethics 
 
Following strict procedures for research involving human subjects at Victoria 
University of Wellington, this study has been assessed and approved by the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration’s Human Ethics Committee. In accordance with the 
Victoria University of Wellington Ethics Guidelines, the voluntary respondents were 
notified the purpose of the research, the confidentiality and rights to withdraw by 
invitation letters emailed to them (see Appendix C). It was assumed that, by 
completing the online survey, respondents’ consents were granted. The data collected 
from the research participants was analysed in an aggregated form for research 
purposes only and was not distributed to any third parties.  
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter described the research method used to collect the primary data. A 
quantitative research design using an online survey was employed to investigate the 
effects of management approaches on risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. An 
invitation email, along with a link to the online survey, was sent to 117 Australian and 
New Zealand firms who perform outsourcing functions to China. Follow-up phone 
calls were also made to improve the response rate. A total of 48 responses were 
received (41 percent response rate). From these, the results of 41 completed responses 
were analysed for the purpose of this study. The reliability of the survey measures was 
conducted through a pilot test on a panel of academic peers and industry experts. The 
validity of the survey measurement was tested using the results of Cronbach’s alph. 
The next chapter reveals the results of the survey data.  
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Chapter 5: Survey results 
 
The previous section outlines the methods used to measure and validate the 
conceptual model through data collection of an online survey. The aim of this chapter 
is to reveal the results of the quantitative survey. This chapter separates the survey 
results responses into three sections. The first section presents demographic data 
about the participating firms and respondents. The second section provides descriptive 
data relating to the participating firms’ outsourcing experience. The last section 
summarises the findings of the research hypotheses that describe the relationships 
among relational factors, transactional factors and risks of offshore outsourcing 
relationships. 
 
5.1 Firm and respondent demographics 
 
The following two sections describe the demographic information about the 
participating firms and respondents. 
 
5.1.1 Firm demographics 
 
Firm demography statistics provide a snapshot of the characteristics of New Zealand 
(NZ) and Australian (AUS) businesses in the current study. Table 5.1 summarises the 
responses from NZ and AUS firms, which are engaged in offshore outsourcing 
production of goods and services to China.  
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Table 5.1: Profile of responding firms 
Range Frequency 
N=41 
Percent 
 
(a) Country of origin    
Australia 20 48.8 
New Zealand 21 51.2 
Total  41 100.0 
   
(b) Total number of employees3   
0-5 7 17.1 
6-20 17 41.5 
21-50 5 12.2 
51-100 2 4.9 
101-200 4 9.8 
200 or more 6 14.6 
Total 41 100.0 
   
(c) Industry   
Manufacturing 12 29.3 
Wholesale Trade 20 48.8 
Retail Trade 9 21.9 
Total 41 100.0 
   
(d) Sales revenue4   
$250,001-$500,000 3 7.3 
$500,001-$1,000,000 2 4.9 
$1,000,001-$5,000,000 13 31.7 
$5,000,001-$10,000,000 5 12.2 
$10,000,001-$20,000,000 7 17.1 
$20,000,001 and over 8 19.5 
Unanswered 3 7.3 
Total 41 100.0 
   
(e) Foreign ownership   
Domestically owned 39 95.1 
Some foreign ownership 2 4.9 
Total 41 100.0 
 
Part (a) of the table indicates that there are 20 AUS firms (48.8%) and 21 NZ firms 
(51.2%). According to the survey results, the earliest establishment among all 
responding firms was in 1950, while the most recent establishment was in 2007. Part 
                                                        
3 The total number of employees was estimated by managers as the end of 2009. The categorisation of 
employee numbers is in accordance with Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS). 
4 Sales revenue as at the end of 2009 and dollars as in firm’s own country currency 
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(b) shows the total number of employees of responding NZ and AUS firms as at the 
end of 2009. The largest proportion of firms had six to 20 employees, which includes 
17 firms, giving it a percentage of 41.5. Only six large firms5, a percentage of 14.6, 
employed more than 200 staffs. According to part (c) of the table, wholesale trade was 
the leading industry, consisting of 20 firms (48.8%). The second largest industry was 
manufacturing, consisting of 12 firms (29.3%). It was followed by retail trade with 
nine firms (21.9 percent). Part (d) shows the sales revenue of responding firms as the 
end of 2009, which indicates that the majority of the firms were placed between the 
one million and five million dollar categories (31.7%). Part (e) reveals that the 
majority of firms surveyed were domestically owned, which comprises 95.1 percent 
of returned data.  
 
5.1.2 Respondent demographics 
 
This section provides descriptive data about the respondents in the survey research. 
Table 5.2 illustrates the general characteristics of responding NZ and AUS firm 
managers. 
 
Table 5.2: Profile of respondents 
Range Frequency 
N=41 
Percent 
 
(f) Decision maker   
Directly involved in outsourcing 35 85.4 
Indirectly involved in outsourcing 6 14.6 
Total  41 100.0 
   
(g)Gender   
Female 21 51.2 
Male 20 48.8 
Total 41 100.0 
   
(h) Working experience in offshore outsourcing 
1-5 years 9 21.9 
6- 10 years 10 24.4 
10 plus years 20 48.8 
Unknown 2 4.9 
Total 41 100.0 
                                                        
5 Statistics New Zealand and Australian Bureau of Statistics categorise firms that employ more 200 
employees as large businesses. 
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The results of the survey were measured based on mid-level firm managers from NZ 
and AUS. According to part (f) of the table, 85.4 percent of managers were directly 
involved in outsourcing decision making. The other 14.6 percent of managers were 
indirectly involved in the firm’s outsourcing decisions. Within the managers surveyed 
in this research 21 were female managers (51.2%) and 20 were male managers (48.8). 
Part (h) of the table shows the majority of firm managers had more than ten years’ 
experience working in offshore outsourcing (48.8%). Only a small number of 
managers had less than five years of experience (21.9%). The results of the survey 
reveal that the managers of NZ and AUS firms have an impressive average 
outsourcing experience of more than ten years among a total of 39 managers (two 
other managers did not answer this particular question). 
 
5.2 Reporting firms’ outsourcing experience 
 
The following sections describe firms’ outsourcing experience internationally as well 
as experience in relation to China.  
 
5.2.1 Firms’ international outsourcing experience  
 
Participants reported that manufacturing activities were their firm’s primary activity. 
Table 5.3 below has summarised responding firms’ overall experience of outsourcing 
manufacturing activities to foreign countries.  
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Table 5.3: Firms’ international outsourcing experience 
Range Frequency 
N=41 
Percent 
 
(i) Outsourcing experience to foreign countries 
0-1 years 0 0.0 
2-3 years 1 2.4 
4-5 years 11 26.8 
6-9 years 9 22.0 
10-15 years 14 34.1 
Over 15 years 6 14.6 
Total 41 100.0 
(j) Percentage of outsourcing business 
5-10% 1 2.4 
10-20% 1 2.4 
20-30% 3 7.3 
30-50% 3 7.3 
50% and over 31 75.6 
Unknown 2 4.9 
Total 41 100.0 
 
Part (i) demonstrates the number of years the NZ and AUS firms have been 
performing offshore outsourcing internationally. Of the 41 who responded, a large 
majority (48.7%6) has been outsourcing internationally for ten years or more. This is 
followed by 29.2 percent7 of firms that performed outsourcing internationally for five 
years or less. The results in the table also reveal that no firm was involved in 
outsourcing activities to foreign countries for less than one year. Part (j) of the table 
reports a firm’s total percentage of outsourcing business. A large proportion (75.6%) 
of firms was outsourcing 50 percent or more activities in foreign countries. Only eight 
firms outsourced less than 50 percent of their business overseas.  
 
5.2.2 Outsourcing destinations 
 
Participants were asked to report their most important and second most important 
outsourcing destinations. Table 5.4 shows 39 firms revealed China as their most 
important destination. The other two firms considered China as their second most 
important destination.  
                                                        
6 The percentage was calculated by adding 34.1% (10-15 years) and 14.6% (over 15 years) together 
7 The percentage was calculated by adding 2.4% (2-3 years) and 26.8% (4-5 years) together 
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Table 5.4: Outsourcing destination 
Outsourcing destination-China Frequency 
N=41 
Percent 
 
Main destination 39  95.1 
2nd destination 2 4.9 
Total 41 100.0 
 
Additional popular outsourcing destinations given by firms that are not shown in the 
table were mostly located in the south and southeast of Asia including India, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and Hong Kong.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
5.2.3 Outsourcing motivations  
 
Respondents were asked to rate the main motivations for outsourcing on a scale of 1 
to 7, where 1 equalled completely unimportant and 7 equalled extremely important. 
Eight different choices of outsourcing motivations are listed in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5: Firms’ outsourcing motivations 
Outsourcing motivations Mean 
N=41 
Std. Deviation  
1. Seeking low costs 6.39 1.046 
2. Improving production flows 5.90 1.081 
3. Serving customers more effectively 5.85 1.329 
4. Seeking skilled labour 5.13 1.472 
5. Accessing new skills and technologies from  
foreign suppliers 
5.05 1.499 
6. Exploiting technological capabilities 4.97 1.967 
7. Focusing on core business 4.97 1.404 
8. Following industry competitors 4.68 1.738 
 
The results of the survey reveal that the main motivation for firms to outsource 
production is seeking low costs. This is followed by the firm’s intentions of improving 
production flows and serving customers more effectively. The motivation of following 
industry competitors was regarded as the least popular reason for firms to perform 
outsourcing activities.  
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5.2.4 Outsourcing experience in China 
 
Participants were asked to specify the year their firms commenced outsourcing 
activities to China. It is revealed that the earliest outsourcing activities to China by a 
firm was in 1980 and the latest activity commenced by a firm was in 2008. Table 5.6 
reveals the average years of outsourcing experience performed by NZ and AUS firms 
to China. 
Table 5.6: Years of outsourcing experience to China 
Range N Mean 
 
Years of outsourcing to China 38 10.6 
   
 
As indicated in Table 5.6, a total of 38 participants answered this particular question. 
The average number of years that the firms have performed outsourcing to China is 
more than ten. 
 
Participants were asked their method of conducting outsourcing activities in China. 
The results are illustrated in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7: Outsourcing method in China 
Range Frequency 
N=41 
Percent 
 
(k) Outsourcing method in China 
Working with suppliers directly 24 58.5 
Working with intermediate parties 4 9.8 
Working with both independent 
suppliers and intermediate parties 
13 31.7 
Total 41 100.0 
 
A majority of firms (58.5%) chose to work with independent Chinese suppliers 
directly. This is followed by 31.7 percent of firms using both independent suppliers 
and intermediate parties. Only 9.8 percent of firms were working with intermediate 
parties alone. 
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5.3 Results of hypothesis testing 
 
The following sections illustrate the survey results from analysis of Pearson’s 
correlation and multiple regressions.  
 
5.3.1 Descriptive results  
 
A correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between variables (Field, 2005). 
There are different ways in which two variables could be related. They could be 
positively or negatively related. However, correlation between two variables does not 
imply the direction of causality. This study used the Pearson’s correlation to find 
correlation between two continuous variables. Table 5.8 gives an overview of the 
correlations between the variables in this study. 
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.Trust 1           
2.Commitment  .486*** 1          
3.Information sharing .028 .478** 1         
4.Communication quality .500*** .378* .071 1        
5.Interdependence .283 .308 .001 .261 1       
6.Guanxi .323* .542*** .347* .369* .389* 1      
7.Contractual complexity .170 .027 -.237 .481** .151 .271 1     
8.Asset specificity -.027 .189 .102 -.064 .234 .353* .128 1    
9.Relational risk -.199 -.190 -.157 -.318* -.168 -.187 -.016 .185 1   
10.Performance risk -.280 -.280 -.209 -.401** -.461** -.168 -.094 .153 .657*** 1  
11. Cultural difference -.083 .188 .023 .050 -.059 .309* .025 .105 .072 .105 1 
            
Mean values 5.0061 5.3333 4.8659 4.9878 3.4837 4.9035 3.4708 4.5813 3.9573 4.1443 5.0244 
Standard deviation  .94660 1.1199 .99598 1.1465 1.0781 1.0117 1.3052 1.1378 .99358 .86642 .72077 
N = 41; *p < .05;** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
For the purpose of easier reading, Table 5.9 below summarises the correlated 
relationships between variables at three different significant levels in this study.  
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Table 5.9: Correlated relationships between variables 
Level of significance Existing links 
  
Correlation at a 0.001 significant level: 1.Trust and commitment  
 2.Trust and communication quality  
 3.Commitment and guanxi  
 4.Relational risk and performance risk 
  
Correlation at a 0.01 significant level: 1.Commitment and information sharing 
 2.Communication quality and contractual complexity 
3.Communication quality and performance risk (negative) 
 4.Interdependence and performance risk (negative) 
  
Correlation at a 0.05 significant level: 1.Commitment and communication quality 
 2.Guanxi and trust 
 3.Guanxi and information sharing  
 4.Guanxi and communication quality  
 6.Guanxi and interdependence  
 7.Guanxi and asset specificity 
 8.Guanxi and cultural difference 
 
At a significant level of 0.001, it is revealed that trust is positively linked with several 
variables including commitment and communication quality. Commitment is 
positively linked to guanxi. In addition, it is important to notice that the main 
dependent variables, relational risk and performance risk, are positively linked at a 
high correlation level. At a significant level of 0.01, it is observed commitment is 
positively linked to information sharing and communication quality is positively 
linked to contractual complexity. It is worth highlighting that performance risk is 
found to be negatively linked to both communication quality and interdependence in 
the results of Pearson’s correlation analysis. At a significant level of 0.05, it is noted 
that guanxi is correlated to six variables including trust, information exchange, 
communication quality, interdependence, asset specificity and cultural difference. 
Lastly, commitment is found to be correlated to communication quality at significant 
levels of 0.05. 
 
5.3.2 Regression results 
 
Regression analysis is used when independent variables are correlated with one 
another and with the dependent variable (Field, 2005). Multiple regression statistics 
testing is an extension of correlation analysis. The result of regression is an equation 
that represents the best prediction of a dependent variable from several independent 
variables (Field, 2005). This study employed simple and multiple regression analyses 
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to explore the relationships among the dependent variable and independent variables. 
The regression equations of this study are formulated below. 
 
Regression equation 1: 
 
RR = a + b1TRU + b2COMMT + b3INFOSHR + b4CMMQUAL + b5INTDEP+ 
b6GUXI + b7CONTRPLX + b8 ASSTSPEF + control variable + e 
 
Regression equation 2: 
 
PR = a + b1TRU + b2COMMT + b3INFOSHR + b4CMMQUAL + b5INTDEP + 
b6GUXI + b7CONTRPLX + b8ASSTSPEF + control variable + e 
 
5.3.2.1 Assumptions of regression analysis 
 
There are several important assumptions underlying regression analysis. This study 
has tested assumptions including independent errors (Durbin-Watson test), no multi-
collinearity (variance inflation factor figure), normality of residuals, residual outliers, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. If any of these assumptions are violated, this can 
considerably lower the reliability of outcomes or make regression analysis impossible 
to use. Thus it is critical to conduct various procedures to prove that the results of 
regression in this study are reliable.  
 
The Durbin-Watson test is designed to examine serial correlations between errors in 
regression models, which specifically tests whether adjacent residuals are correlated 
(Field, 2005). It is noted that values less than 1 or greater than 3 are cause for concern 
and the closer to 2 that the value is, the better (Durbin & Watson, 1952). 
Where: RR stands for relational risk 
 PR stands for performance risk 
 TRU stands for trust 
 COMMT stands for commitment 
 INFOSHR stands for information sharing 
 CMMQUAL stands for communication quality 
 INTDEP stands for interdependence 
 GUXI stands for guanxi 
 CONTRPLX stands for contractual complexity 
 ASSTSPEF stands for asset specificity 
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Table 5.10: Result of Durbin-Watson test 
 
Table 5.10 showed the figures produced by the Durbin-Watson test is between 1 and 3. 
Model 1 in the form of regression equation 1 reveals value of 1.924. Model 2 in the 
form of regression equation 2 shows a value of 1.878. Both values are close to 2, 
which indicate that there is no serial correlation found among residuals and the 
assumption has been met.  
 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) is a measure of multi-collinearity. The VIF shows 
whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with the other predictors (Field, 
2005).  
Table 5.11: Assumptions of regression analysis 
Variables  VIF 
1.Trust  1.764 
2.Commitment  2.065 
3.Information sharing  1.657 
4.Communication quality  2.144 
5.Interdependence  1.544 
6.Guanxi  2.496 
7.Contractual complexity  1.634 
8.Asset specificity  1.580 
9.Cultural difference  1.228 
 
According to Myers (1990), a VIF value less than 10 is acceptable. In Table 5.11, all 
of the VIF values are less than 10, which indicate that there is no linear relationship 
between two or more of the predictors and the assumption has been met. 
 
In the analysis, the regression assumptions including normality of residuals, 
homoscedasticity and linearity by examining the P-P plot and scatterplot were 
checked (see Apendix A). The P-P plot reports whether the data set is following 
normal distribution (Field, 2005). A scatterplot is used to determine homoscedasticity 
and linearity, which requires the residuals at each level of the predictor to have the 
same variance and linear relationship (Field, 2005). The results of these tests indicate 
 M 1 M 2 
Durbin-Watson test  
 
1.924 1.878 
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none of the assumptions are violated8 in the analysis.  
 
5.3.2.2 Results of regression analysis 
 
Table 5.12 reports the results of multiple regression analysis for outsourcing supplier 
risks. In the table, Model 1 reveals an ANOVA sig value of .475 (p>.05), which 
implies Model 1 is not a good fit. The value of R2 is 22.7 percent, which indicates 
22.7 percent of variation in outsourcing relational risk is explained by six relational 
factors, two transactional factors and cultural difference.  
 
Model 2 achieved an ANOVA sig value of .012 (p<.05), which indicates Model 2, 
overall, predicts performance risk significantly well. The R2 value of Model 2 is 47 
percent, which means the predictors, comprising of six relational factors, two 
transactional factors and cultural difference, accounts for 47 percent of the variation in 
outsourcing performance risk.  
 
Table 5.12: Results of multiple regression analysis  
                                                        
8 Results of the P-P plot and scatterplot are included in the appendix. 
Variables M 1 - Relational Risk M 2 - Performance risk 
 UnStand.B t-value  Sig. UnStand.B t-value Sig. 
Independent variables  
Trust .032 .147 .884 .030 .194 .847 
Commitment -.034 -.165 .870 -.078 -.543 .591 
Information 
sharing 
-.083 -.408 .686 -.219 -1.534 .136 
Communication 
quality 
-.233 -1.203 .238 -.197 -1.448 .158 
Interdependence -.039 -.215 .831 -.311 -2.454 .020* 
Guanxi -.256 -1.054 .300 -.014 -.080 .937 
Contractual 
complexity 
.094 .603 .551 -.007 -.064 .950 
Asset specificity .273 1.612 .117 .276 2.324 .027* 
Control variables: 
Cultural difference .101 .401 .691 -.023 -.132 .896 
Dependent variables:  
Relational risk - - - .573 5.439 .000*** 
Performance risk .753 5.439 .000*** - - - 
R2 .227 .470 
ANOVA Sig .475 .012* 
F value .981 2.953 
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N= 40. Significance level: *p < .05;** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts there is a positive relationship between relational and 
performance risk. The result of regression analysis shows a highly significant 
relationship between relational risk and performance risk (t=5.439, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, the b-value of un-standardised coefficients is positive, implying a 
positive relationship between relational risk and performance risk (b=.573~.753). 
Thus Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
Hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f predict there are negative relationships 
between relational risk (dependent variable) and relational factors including trust, 
commitment, information sharing, communication quality, interdependence and 
guanxi. The results of multiple regression analysis find no significant connections 
between relational risk as a dependent variable and all relational factors (t =-1.203 
~ .147, p=.238 ~.884). Thus hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f are rejected. 
 
Hypotheses 3, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e and 3f argue that performance risk (dependent 
variable) would negatively impact on all relational factors including trust, 
commitment, information sharing, communication quality, interdependence and 
guanxi. However, the only significant correlation revealed by regression analysis 
results is between performance risk and interdependence (t= -2.454, p <0.05). The b 
value shows a negative coefficient, which indicates a negative relationship between 
performance risk and interdependence (b= -.311). Thus Hypothesis 3e is supported. In 
contrast, no sufficient evidence is found between performance risk (dependent 
variable) and the five other relational factors: trust, commitment, information sharing, 
communication quality, and guanxi (t=-2.454 ~ .194, p=.136 ~.847). Accordingly, 
there is only partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypotheses 4, 4a and 4b predict negative relationships between performance risk 
(dependent variable) and all transactional factors including contractual complexity 
and asset specificity. The results of regression analysis revealed no support for 
Hypothesis 4a (b= -.007, t= -.064, p=.950). However, the result in Table 5.13 reveals a 
positive relationship between asset specificity and performance (b=.276, t= 2.324, 
p<0.05), which implies a high level of asset specificity among outsourcing firms leads 
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to higher performance risk. Therefore, none of the hypotheses are supported by the 
survey results. 
 
Hypotheses 5, 5a and 5b predict relational risk (dependent variable) is positively 
correlated to transactional factors, including contractual complexity and asset 
specificity. The results of regression analysis show insufficient evidence to support 
Hypotheses 5, 5a and 5b (b= .094 ~ .273, t= .603 ~ .1.612, p=.117 ~ .551).  
 
5.3.2.2.1 Testing the indirect effects of relational risk (Hypotheses 6, 6a and 6b) 
 
The results of multiple regression analysis in Table 5.12 reveal that relational risk is 
not significantly correlated with relational factors and transactional factors. In this 
study, it is also hypothesised that relational risk may have an indirect effect on the 
relationship between relational factors and performance risk. Thus, relational risk is 
tested for moderating and mediating effects. Due to the number of independent 
variables involved, this study used factor analysis to examine whether these variables 
belong in the same group or different groups of variables. In Table 5.13, the results of 
the factor analysis suggest the six relational factors only reflect a single variable 
(Eigen value >1, all six factor loadings >0.5). Similarly, the factor analysis results 
indicated the two transactional factors also reflect one factor (Eigen value >1, both 
factor loadings >0.5). Accordingly, two variables were obtained by averaging all 
scores for six relational factors and two transactional factors. These variables are 
aggregate relational factors (ARF) and aggregate transactional factors (ATF). 
 
Table 5.13: The results of factor analysis 
Variables  
N=41. 
 
Relational variables 
Factor 1 
 
 
Transactional variables 
Factor 1 
Trust .727  - 
Commitment .818  - 
Information exchange .520  - 
Communication quality .649  - 
Interdependence .530  - 
Guanxi .752  - 
Contractual complexity -  .751 
Asset specificity -  .751 
Eigen value 2.734  1.128 
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In general, the moderating effects are indicated by the interaction between the 
dependent variable and the moderating variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To become a 
moderating variable, the variable should not be correlated with the independent 
variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In Table 5.14, Model 2 shows relational risk (RR) as 
the moderating variable is significantly correlated with aggregate relational factors 
(ARF), implying the rule of being a moderator is violated. Model 3 reveals RR has no 
direct effect on independent variables (ARF and ATF) and the interaction effects 
(ARF x RR and ATF x RR). Therefore, the regression results suggest RR does not 
play a moderating role between relational factors and performance risk, indicating a 
lack of support for Hypothesis 6a.  
 
Table 5.14: Regression results for the indirect effects of relational risk 
Dependent  
Variables 
Relational Risk Performance Risk 
M1 M2 M3 
UnStand.B t-value  Sig. UnStand.B t-value  Sig. UnStand.B t-value  Sig. 
Independent variables 
ARF -.614 -3.359 .002** -.364 -2.294 .028* -.680 -1.001 .324 
ATF .146 1.044 .303 .041 .351 .727 -.251 -.506 .616 
Variable of interest 
RR - - - .490 4.527 .000*
** 
-.253 -.253 .768 
Interactions 
ARF x RR - - - - - - .082 .507 .533 
ATF x RR - - - - - - .088 .489 .613 
ANOVA Sig. .007** .000*** .000*** 
R2 .229 .504 .517 
N= 41. Significance level: *p < .05;** p < .01; ***p < .001. ARF stands for aggregate relational factors; 
ATF stands for aggregate transactional factors; RR stands for relational risk.  
 
To establish the mediating effects of relational risk, four steps are required (Judd & 
Kenny, 1981; Baron & Kenny, 1986): 
1. The independent variable is correlated with the mediator 
2. The independent variable is correlated with the dependent variable 
3. The mediator should affect the dependent variable 
4. To establish whether the mediator completely mediates the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables, the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable controlling for the intervening variable 
should be zero. 
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Model 1 illustrates the mediator (RR) is highly correlated with ARF at a significant 
level of 0.05, which upholds the first step of establishing mediation. Model 2 further 
shows ARF is significantly correlated with performance risk (p<0.05), which supports 
Step 2 of establishing mediation. The results of Model 2 in Table 5.14 also reveal 
relational risk is significantly correlated with performance risk (p<0.001) implying 
Step 3 is satisfied. Thus, it is established that first three steps of relational risk being a 
mediator between relational factors9 and performance risk have been supported.  
 
Step 4 determines whether relational risk completely or partially mediates the 
relationship between relational factors and performance risk. According to Baron and 
Kenny (1986), a complete mediation is the case when the independent variable (ARF) 
no longer affects performance risk (dependent variable); the mediator (relational risk) 
will be significantly related to performance risk. However, the results in Table 5.14 
demonstrate a partial mediation effect in which the mediator (relational risk) is 
significantly related to performance risk (dependent variable), while the independent 
variable (ARF) is affecting performance risk (p<0.05) as well. To conclude the 
regression results in this study, relational risk as the mediator played a partial 
mediation effect on the relationship between relational factors and performance risk 
(dependent variable), indicating Hypothesis 6b is supported.  
 
5.3.2.2.2 Control variable (cultural difference)  
 
It is assumed in Chapter 3 that cultural differences such as language, religion, the way 
of thinking, and management style would contribute to performance risk and 
relational risk. Table 5.12 showed that cultural difference had no significant effect on 
both relational risk and performance risk (b= -.023 ~.101, t= -.132 ~ .401, p= .691 
~ .896).  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Relational factors used to test indirect effects of relational risk are the average score of 6 relational 
factors from an aggregate measure, which is indicated in 5.3.3.2.1. 
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5.3.2.3 Summary of hypotheses testing results 
 
Table 5.15 illustrates the hypotheses that were supported or rejected. The survey data 
shows a significant correlation between the dependent variables (relational risk and 
performance risk) investigated in this study, which supports Hypothesis 1. Relational 
risk as the dependent variable shows no significant correlations with six of the 
relational factors, two of the transitional factors and the control variable (cultural 
difference). Only two significant relationships are found to exist with performance 
risk as the dependent variable among six relational factors, two transitional factors 
and the control variable (cultural difference). The relationship between 
interdependence and performance risk is fully supported by the survey data, while the 
other relationship between asset specificity and performance risk reveals an opposite 
direction to that proposed in Chapter 3. Finally, relational risk is discovered in the 
study as mediating between an aggregated measure of relational factors and 
performance risk (dependent variable). 
 
Table 5.15: Summary of hypotheses testing results 
Hypothesis Factors Results 
H1 Relational risk and performance risk (+) Supported 
H2 Relational factors and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2a Trust and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2b Commitment and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2c Information exchange and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2d Communication and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2e Interdependence and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H2f Guanxi and relational risk (-) Rejected 
H3 Relational factors and performance risk (-) Partially supported 
H3a Trust and performance risk (-) Rejected 
H3b Commitment and performance risk (-) Rejected 
H3c Information exchange and performance risk (-) Rejected 
H3d Communication and performance (-) Rejected 
H3e Interdependence and performance risk (-) Supported 
H3f Guanxi and performance risk (-) Rejected 
H4 Transactional factors and performance risk (-) Partially supported 
H4a Contractual complexity and performance risk (-) Rejected 
H4b Asset specificity and performance risk (-) Partially supported  
(opposite direction) 
H5 Transactional factors and relational risk (+) Rejected 
H5a Contractual complexity and relational risk (+) Rejected 
H5b Asset specificity and relational risk (+) Rejected 
H6 Indirect effect of relational risk  Partially supported 
H6a Relational risk as a moderating variable Rejected 
H6b Relational risk as a mediating variable Supported 
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5.4 Chapter summary 
 
The data presented and analysed in this chapter was obtained from responses to an 
online survey, which was created and designed for the study of managing risks of 
offshore outsourcing relationships to China. The results of the data analysis showed a 
significant correlation between performance risk and relational risk. However, no 
evidence supported the relationships between relational risk and all independent 
variables including relational factors and transactional factors. On the other hand, 
performance risk is negatively correlated with interdependence, but positively related 
to asset specificity. Most importantly, relational risk was found to have a mediating 
effect on the relationship between aggregate relational factors and performance risk. 
The results of all hypotheses testing will be discussed at a more in-depth level in 
Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
The focus of Chapter 5 was to present the results of the quantitative survey and 
analyse them for their relevance to the research hypotheses. The purpose of this 
chapter is to interpret these results and provide a meaningful discussion. This chapter 
is divided into two sections. The first section summarises the findings of the 
hypotheses testing from Chapter 5. This section covers two areas of discussion. The 
first part discusses the results for each research hypothesis presented in Chapter 5. 
The second part discusses the findings that relate to the conceptual model as revealed 
in Chapter 3. In addition, a modified research model is presented, based on the 
findings of the survey. Lastly, the second section of this chapter highlights important 
contributions this study makes to the literature on risk management in offshore 
outsourcing relationships.  
 
6.1 Findings from the survey  
 
This study is designed to determine whether a relational approach and a transactional 
approach, guided by social exchange theory and transactional cost theory, can 
minimise risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. The results illustrated in Chapter 
5 have found some support for the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. Hypotheses 1, 
3e and 6b were fully supported by the survey data. Hypothesis 4b was partially 
supported (although, significantly, in the opposite direction). The findings of the 
hypotheses testing are discussed below. 
 
6.1.1 Discussion on hypotheses testing  
 
To examine the offshore outsourcing supplier risks, this study introduced two types of 
risks, relational risk and performance risk (dependent variables), that are 
conceptualised by Das and Teng (1996) see Chapter 2. Based on social exchange 
theory and transaction cost theory, this study proposed two management approaches 
to minimise outsourcing supplier risks, the relational approach and the transactional 
approach. These approaches are translated into two sets of independent variables 
(relational factors and transactional factors) in Chapter 3 as the critical variables in 
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explaining relational risk and performance risk. The analysis of the quantitative data 
presented in Chapter 5 showed some interesting results.  
 
6.1.1.1 Interactions between relational risk and performance risk (H1) 
 
The survey data has supported the prediction of Hypothesis 1, which confirms a 
positive relationship between relational and performance risk. In the context of 
offshore outsourcing relationships, this finding can be understood as a high level of 
conflict between buyer firms and supplier firms (relational risk is high) that 
discourages cooperation efforts between supplier firms, which results in a 
disappointing outsourcing performance (performance risk is high). Correspondingly, a 
high performance risk is reflected in terms of late delivery, poor quality and longer 
lead times, causing conflicts (high relational risk). If buyer firms and supplier 
outsourcing firms are unable to resolve the conflicts, cooperative behaviours between 
exchange outsourcing firms are reduced. In the situation of a low level of conflict 
among outsourcing exchange firms (low relational risk), uncooperative behaviour 
such as opportunism is discouraged, which results in lower performance risk and vice 
versa. 
 
6.1.1.2 Interactions between relational risk and relational factors (H2, 2a, 2b, 2c, 
2d, 2e and 2f) 
 
The survey results show there is no evidence for a negative effect between relational 
risk (dependent variable) and the relational factors (independent variables) of trust, 
commitment, information sharing, communication quality, interdependence and 
guanxi. These findings are quite unexpected, but the reliability and validity tests 
performed on relational risk and relational factors do not appear to have major 
measurement problems as noted in Chapter 4. All measurement items of the six 
relational factors have been tested repeatedly in many different papers and confirmed 
as credible (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Lee & Kim, 1999; Mao et al., 2008; Han et al., 
2008). Furthermore, the regression results in Table 5.15 show a negative correlation 
between aggregate relational factors (ARF) and relational risk (Model 1 without 
control variable), which illustrates some supports for Hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e 
and 2f.  
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There are several possibilities as to why no significant relationships were found 
between relational risk and relational factors. Firstly, the number of observations may 
be too small. A larger number of observations may have helped this study gain more 
statistical power in SPSS regression analysis. Secondly, there might be too many 
relational factors involved in this study, which did not work statistically with a small 
sample size. The six relational factors may need to be aggregated. However, the 
possibility of re-aggregating the variables may not be conceptually sound. Each 
individual relational factor is designed to capture different aspect of offshore 
outsourcing relationships. In future research, concentration on a smaller number of the 
most crucial relational variables is recommended. Furthermore, future research calls 
for more accurate measurements of relational risk in the context of offshore 
outsourcing relationship management. It is recognised that the idea of operationalising 
relational risk in the context of offshore outsourcing relationship management is still 
at an exploratory stage. Hence there is room for improvement of the measurement 
items used to examine relational risk in the future.   
 
6.1.1.3 Interactions between performance risk and relational factors (H3, 3a, 3b, 
3c, 3d, 3e and 3f) 
 
The only hypothesis supported by the quantitative data in Chapter 5 is Hypothesis 3e, 
which reveals a negative relationship between interdependence (relational factor) and 
performance risk (dependent variable). This finding is consistent with social exchange 
theory, which stresses the importance of interdependence among outsourcing 
exchange firms. The notion of social exchange theory assumes that an interdependent 
relationship ensures members of outsourcing exchange parties will work towards a 
mutually beneficial goal (Homan, 1958; Blau, 1964; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978). It is 
argued by Mohr and Spekman (1994) that the advantage of interdependence provides 
benefits greater than one could achieve alone. Thus a high level of interdependence 
promotes cooperative behaviour and reduces performance risk subsequently. 
Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 receives partial support.  
 
The results for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d and 3f present no evidence to support a high 
level of trust, commitment, information exchange, communication quality and guanxi 
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reducing outsourcing performance risk. The possible answers to these findings are 
similar to those for relational risk as the dependent variable. Firstly, a larger research 
sample size may potentially help resolve the issue of insufficient evidence among 
predicted relationships in SPSS. Secondly, a reduced number of relational factors 
would help future study to concentrate more on the most important relational factors 
in managing risks in outsourcing relationships. Lastly, enhanced measurement items 
of performance risk would offer better statistical power in SPSS.  
 
6.1.1.4 Interactions between performance risk and transactional factors (H4, 4a, 
4b) 
 
Hypothesis 4b has the only significant correlation found in the survey results, which 
reveals a positive relationship between performance risk (dependent variable) and 
asset specificity. It implies that a high level of asset specificity among outsourcing 
firms leads to higher performance risk. This finding shows a conclusion that works in 
the opposite direction to what was originally predicted in Chapter 3. There are several 
justifications for an increase in asset specificity leading to an increase in perceived 
performance risk. When an offshore outsourcing venture requires significant 
relationship-specific investments, the related costs of developing these relationship-
specific investments will rise (Williamson, 1983). The escalating cost of managing 
offshore outsourcing relationships is viewed as a form of performance risk. Secondly, 
it is noted in Chapter 3 that outsourcing firms tend to safeguard relationship-specific 
investments, due to mutually high costs of termination and high levels of dependence 
among exchange firms. According to TCT (Williamson, 1985), when relationship-
specific investments are high, the potential risk of becoming locked-in with an 
outsourcing supplier tends to be high as well (high performance risk).  
 
Hypothesis 4a predicts a negative relationship between performance risk and 
contractual complexity. The survey results did not support this hypothesis as outlined 
in Chapter 5. There are several possibilities as to why Hypothesis 4a is not supported. 
Firstly, the sample size is too small to detect any statistical significance between 
performance risk and contractual complexity. Secondly, outsourcing buyer firms may 
believe it takes more than highly customised contracts to minimise performance risk 
in outsourcing relationships. It is argued that firms should consider using the 
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relational approach and transactional approach as complements to improve exchange 
performance, thus potentially lowering offshore outsourcing relationship risks (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002; Barthelemy, 2003b). Thirdly, it is emphasised the content of a good 
contract should vary according to the level of perceived risks (Joskow, 1988; 
Williamson, 1991). It is possible that the outsourcing firms surveyed for this study 
may have a low perception of outsourcing performance risk within their relationships, 
so the need to develop stringent contracts is not as important.   
 
6.1.1.5 Interactions between relational risk and transactional factors (H5, 5a, 5b) 
 
The survey results show no support for Hypotheses 5, 5a and 5b, which predict 
positive associations between relational risk (dependent variable) and transactional 
factors including contractual complexity and asset specificity. It is argued in Chapter 2 
that social exchange theorists suggest that highly customised contracts (transactional 
factor) signal distrust of exchange parties and encourage opportunistic behaviours 
(relational risk) among exchange parties (Macaulay, 1963; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
In addition, TCT indicates high relationship-specific investments that cannot be 
transferrable to other activities could encourage exchange firms to behave 
opportunistically (Williamson, 1981, 1985). These arguments all lead to the 
predictions of Hypotheses 5, 5a and 5b. The results of the validity, reliability and 
assumption tests of relational risk, contract complexity and asset specificity are all 
satisfied. Thus, there are two possible explanations to explain the lack of correlation. 
Firstly, a larger sample size would help this study achieve better statistical power in 
establishing sufficient evidence between relational risk and transactional factors. 
Secondly, refined measurement items of relational risk would offer better 
understanding of the relationships between relational risk and transactional factors 
 
6.1.1.6 Indirect effect of relational risk (H6, 6a and 6b) 
 
The survey results show that relational risk has a partial mediating effect on the 
interactions between aggregate relational factors (independent variable) and 
performance risk (dependent variable). As shown in Table 5.15, the strong negative 
relationship between aggregate relational factors and relational risk in Model 1 
indicates a cooperative relationship based on trust, commitment, information sharing, 
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communication quality, interdependence and guanxi is crucial in order to reduce 
relational risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. Model 2 also revealed a positive 
relationship between relational risk and performance risk, which indicates that a 
higher level of relational risk results in a higher level of performance risk. 
Furthermore, Model 2 showed a negative relationship between aggregate relational 
factors and performance risk, which suggests relational factors, such as trust and 
commitment, can be used to minimise performance risk. The implication of these 
findings demonstrates a relational approach based on factors such as trust, 
commitment and information sharing reduces relational risk, which may also lead to a 
reduction in performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. Thus, it is 
important to treat relational risk as a critical element in managing risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships.  
 
6.1.1.7 The role of cultural difference as control variable  
 
It is argued that cultural difference contributes to risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships including performance risk and relational risk (Dhar et al, 2006; Ellram 
et al, 2008; Herath & Kishore, 2009). Cultural differences such as a language barrier 
can create difficulties and cause misunderstandings between outsourcing supplier and 
buyer firms. The implication of not managing cultural difference effectively may 
result in production delay (performance risk), difference in quality expectation 
(performance risk), or even conflicts (relational risk) due to miscommunication and 
lack of understanding of cultural behaviours.  
 
The survey result shows no evidence of cultural difference affecting performance and 
relational risk. There are two possible reasons for these findings. Firstly, the lack of 
quantitative data support due to small sample size. Secondly, the survey data was 
returned mainly by outsourcing manufacturing firms. They may not treat cultural 
difference as a key contributor to the risks of offshore outsourcing relationships. The 
outsourcing firms that replied may choose to focus more on outsourcing relationship-
specific risks instead of macro-environmental issues such as cultural difference.  
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6.1.2 A modified research model  
 
Based on the conceptualisation made in Chapter 3, the survey results established four 
significant relationships. Firstly, a strong and positive correlation was found between 
relational risk and performance risk. Secondly, there is a negative relationship 
between interdependence and performance risk. Thirdly, a negative association was 
found between asset specificity and performance risk. Lastly, it is found that relational 
risk played a mediating role between aggregate relational factors and performance risk. 
 
Due to insufficient evidence among predicted relationships in the survey results, this 
study chooses not to include specific relational and transactional factors in the 
modified model. Thus, the modified model presented in Figure 6.1 drew insights 
partially from the survey results and partially from some conceptualisation presented 
in Chapter 3. There are two main differences between the conceptual model presented 
in Chapter 3 and this modified research model. First, relational risk plays a mediating 
role in the interactions between relational factors and performance risk. Secondly, the 
relational factors are not directly affecting performance risk (negative relationship), 
but through the mediator (relational risk). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The modified research model 
 
The modified research model has kept the conceptualisation related to transactional 
factors, which suggests a positive correlation with relational risk, but a negative 
association with performance risk. This study continues with the argument that a 
transactional approach reflected in transactional factors is likely to be an effective 
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management approach in reducing the performance risk in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. Based on the survey results, the modified research model demonstrates 
that relational risk is a mediator between relational factors and performance risk. In 
addition, the model shows that relational risk is positively related to performance risk 
according to the survey results. Furthermore, the relational factors are negatively 
associated with performance risk through the mediating effect of relational risk, as 
revealed by the survey results. It is recommended that testing of this modified 
research model is carried out in the future.  
 
6.2 Research contributions 
 
This section addresses the important contributions of this study to the existing 
literature. These contributions are made in several ways.  
 
Firstly, research relating to risk management of offshore outsourcing relationships has 
not been adequately reflected in the literature. Considerable research effort has been 
focussed on the understanding of areas such as outsourcing decisions and outsourcing 
outcomes (Chadee & Raman, 2009). This study expands current literature by 
addressing this research gap. To effectively address the research problem of this study, 
it was necessary to source theoretical understandings from various perspectives. In 
addition, the conceptual model of this study, which incorporated literature from a risk 
perspective, relational perspective and transactional cost perspective, builds a 
theoretical foundation for future testing.  
 
Secondly, this study operationalised relational risk and performance risk from a 
conceptual idea (Das & Teng, 1996) and applied it in the context of offshore 
outsourcing. In addition, empirically testing relational risk for a mediating effect in 
this study is a novel concept in offshore outsourcing literature. Furthermore, this study 
employed a China-specific factor (guanxi), which adds a cultural characteristic to the 
investigation of offshore outsourcing relationships. 
 
Thirdly, this study contributes to current literature by discovering new findings. Firstly, 
the survey results found that relational risk played a critical role as a mediator 
between aggregate relational factors and performance risk. The implication of this 
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finding demonstrates the importance of minimising relational risk when managing 
offshore outsourcing relationships. It also found relational risk is positively related to 
performance risk. This finding implies offshore outsourcing firms should not only 
concentrate on minimising risks associated with outsourcing performance, but also on 
relational risks due to mismanagement of outsourcing relationships. Finally, the 
findings of the survey show that the interdependence between outsourcing buyer firms 
and supplier firms reduces performance. 
 
The final contribution is made to the research context of current literature. In 
comparison with Europe and North America, less offshore outsourcing research has 
focussed on outsourcing firms in New Zealand and Australia. It is useful to extend the 
existing research context by studying risks in offshore outsourcing relationships from 
New Zealand and Australian perspectives. This study also chooses to focus on China 
as a research context for two reasons. Firstly, China is one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world (Buckley, 2007). Secondly, China is an important trading 
destination for Australian and New Zealand outsourcing firms (Australian Department 
of Affairs and Trade, 2010; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2010). Thus, this study provides useful insights for Australian and New Zealand 
outsourcing firms into managing supplier risks when outsourcing to China. 
 
6.3 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has provided a detailed discussion of the survey results that were 
analysed in Chapter 5. A modified conceptual model was presented to reflect the new 
findings of the quantitative survey. The modified conceptual model provides an 
important research foundation for future testing of offshore outsourcing supplier risks. 
This chapter has also described the new insights made into current literature in terms 
of theoretical contribution, methodological contribution, new research findings and 
application of different research contexts. The next chapter concludes the research by 
summarising the key arguments, offering managerial implications, presenting 
limitations and proposing directions for future research.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the purpose of this empirical study was to examine whether 
relationship management approaches can minimise risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. In order to achieve this research objective, Chapter 2 of this study drew 
upon literature from a range of different perspectives, including the risk perspective, 
the relational perspective and the transactional cost perspective. Based on the 
literature review of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presented a conceptual model that 
incorporated all three perspectives. In Chapter 4, the model and pertinent hypotheses 
were tested using a quantitative research method involving an online survey of 
Australian and New Zealand managers. The focus of Chapters 5 and 6 was on solving 
the effects of management approaches on the risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships. The results of survey data showed some support for using the relational 
approach to minimise performance risk. Moreover, the survey results demonstrated 
the importance of managing relational risk in offshore outsourcing relationships, as 
relational risk mediates the association between the relational approach and 
performance risk.  
 
In order to determine the effects of management approaches on risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships, this study proposed three research questions in Chapter 1.  
 
The first research question of this study was in determining the risks relating to 
offshore outsourcing relationships from the literature. This question has been 
answered in Chapter 2 of this study. Based on the understanding of risk perspectives, 
this study categorises offshore outsourcing risks into relational risk and performance 
risk, which was conceptualised by Das and Teng, (1996). Relational risk focuses on 
the probability and consequences of outsourcing exchange firms cooperating 
unsatisfactorily on a joint goal (Das and Teng, 1996). In contrast, performance risk 
accounts for the probability and consequences of not accomplishing strategic 
objectives, despite satisfactory cooperation among outsourcing exchange firms (Das 
and Teng, 1996). 
 
The second research question was to uncover the types of management approaches 
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that can diminish risks in the offshore outsourcing relationship. Based on the 
relational perspective and transaction cost perspective, this study proposed two 
management approaches to minimising risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
The relational approach is grounded in the SET (relational perspective), which 
encourages exchange parties to develop outsourcing relationships based on social 
norms such as trust, commitment, and interdependence, and therefore overcome 
outsourcing relational risk caused by uncooperative behaviours such as opportunism. 
The transactional approach is guided by TCT (transaction cost perspective), which 
supports the enforcement of formal contracts to resolve outsourcing performance risk, 
such as low quality level and late delivery, caused by not achieving strategic 
objectives. Hence, the second research question is answered. 
 
The last research question of this study was to draw links between management 
approaches and risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, based on the development 
and testing of a research model. The results of hypotheses testing pertinent to the 
research model indicated four findings. Firstly, the relational approach based on 
interdependence of outsourcing exchange firms reduces performance risk. Secondly, a 
high level of asset specificity can cause an increase of performance risk in offshore 
outsourcing relationships. Thirdly, performance risk is found to be positively and 
highly associated with relational risk. Most importantly, this study discovers that 
relational risk has a mediating effect on the association between relational approaches 
and performance risk. Thus, the third research question of this study is also answered. 
 
7.1 Managerial implications 
 
The findings of this study provide several implications for managers of offshore 
outsourcing buyer firms.  
 
Firstly, the results show that relational risk and performance risk in offshore 
outsourcing relationships are highly correlated. This finding indicates that when it 
comes to managing risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, outsourcing managers 
should not just focus on the obvious performance risk such as late delivery and low 
quality but also recognise the danger of increasing relational risk, such as conflicts 
and opportunistic behaviours, since a higher level of relational risk can contribute to a 
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higher level of performance risk. 
 
Secondly, the results illustrate that when outsourcing buyer firms and supplier firms 
are interdependent on each other, the performance risk in offshore outsourcing 
relationships is reduced. This finding suggests outsourcing managers should develop 
relationships with supplier firms based on interdependence, as this can result in a 
stronger focus by the supplier firms on sustaining relationships and achieving mutual 
benefits. Correspondingly, the performance risk tends to diminish when outsourcing 
buyer-supplier firms are working towards a mutual objective,  
 
Thirdly, the finding about the negative effect of asset specificity on performance risk 
implies that the outsourcing manager needs to minimise the level of relationship-
specific investments in offshore outsourcing, because it can lead to a high level of 
reliance on offshore outsourcing suppliers. Consequently, the suppliers could become 
less motivated to fulfil outsourcing objectives, which contributes to a higher level of 
performance risk in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
 
Finally, this study finds a partial mediating effect of relational risk on the interactions 
between relational factors and performance risk. This suggests outsourcing managers 
can use a relational approach based on factors such as trust, commitment, and 
information sharing to minimise relational risks, which may also lead to a reduction in 
performance risks in offshore outsourcing relationships. In addition, outsourcing 
managers need to recognise relational risk as an important element when it comes to 
managing risk in offshore outsourcing activities. It is also vital for outsourcing 
managers to utilise the relational approach in the design of risk management practices 
in offshore outsourcing.  
 
7.2 Limitations 
 
This study has found some support for managing risk in offshore outsourcing 
relationships by utilising the relational approach. In addition, the establishment of the 
mediating role of relational risk between the relational approach and performance risk 
in offshore outsourcing relationships added a further theoretical contribution to the 
extant literature. In order to improve research proficiency, it is critical for academic 
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scholars to learn from the limitations of their study. This section examines the 
limitations that have arisen during the process of this study.  
 
The first issue is related to the generalisability of this study. Although the return 
response of the online survey was excellent (48/117 managers responded), the size of 
sample is relatively small (41 completed survey). The small sample size clearly 
impacted on the lack of correlations between relational factors and relational risks. It 
was discovered during the data collection period that many outsourcing managers 
were on business trips to China during October and November. Some outsourcing 
managers suggested during reminder phone calls that the month of May is a more 
suitable time for collecting survey data.  
 
Secondly, the survey results showed no significant correlations between relational 
factors and relational risks, which may be caused by the measurement items of 
relational risk. This study attempted to capture the main factors of relational risk in 
the context of offshore outsourcing relationships by utilising the conceptual ideas 
from Das and Teng (1996). By doing so, this study has already made some 
methodological contributions to the extant literature. However, the conceptualisation 
from Das and Teng was based in a different research setting, thus repeated 
measurement validations are required to assure the risk factors in the context of 
offshore outsourcing relationships are accurately represented. It is acknowledged that 
there are some imperfections in this study. Nevertheless, the limitations discussed in 
this study provide a good platform for future research.   
 
7.3 Recommendations for future research 
 
On the basis of this study, it is recommended that other scholars fully test the 
conceptual model by improving the generalisability in future research. With a larger 
sample size, analysis of the interaction between relational factors and relational risk 
would generate a higher statistical power in establishing significant correlations. 
Secondly, an extension of this study is to reduce the number of relational factors for a 
better representation of the relational approach. In addition, future research may also 
consider the utilisation of other relational factors such as top management 
involvement (Lee et al., 2010), relationship stability (Luo, 1997; Lai, 2009), and long 
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term orientation (Dong, et al., 2008) to expand the understanding of the outsourcing 
relational approach. Thirdly, future research contexts of managing risks in offshore 
outsourcing relationships could involve different countries, different industries and 
different outsourcing destinations, in order to facilitate the development of theoretical 
understanding in the research area. Finally, longitudinal research comparing risks and 
management approaches used by different industries and countries will provide more 
robust results. 
 
7.4 Final statement 
 
The aim of this study is not only to examine the effects of management approaches on 
risks in offshore outsourcing relationships, but also to re-emphasise offshore 
outsourcing risk management as an important research topic in offshore outsourcing 
literature. This study is aware that managing risks in offshore outsourcing 
relationships is a complex problem. Keeping in mind the complexity of this topic, this 
study has provided a sound theoretical base from which fellow scholars can carry out 
future research.  
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Appendix A: P-P Plot and Scatterplot of Equation 1 
 
 
Relational risk as dependent variable 
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Appendix B: P-P Plot and Scatterplot of Equation 2 
 
 
Performance risk as dependent variable 
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Appendix C: Invitation letter  
Dear  
 
My name is Cindy Zhang, and I am a Masters student in International Business at 
Victoria University of Wellington. As part of my degree I am undertaking a research 
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Administration’s Human Ethics Committee. Your responses will be kept confidential and 
will in no way be linked to you. All information you provide will be aggregated and used 
for research purposes only and will not be released or distributed to third parties. The data 
collected will be used for this research and may also be used for academic publications. 
However, the research data will be destroyed three years after the conclusion of the 
research 
 
For additional information about this research, please do not hesitate to contact me or my 
supervisors Dr Audra Mockaitis and Dr Hongzhi Gao. 
 
Warm regards,  
 
Cindy Zhang Masters Student, School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand 
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Appendix D: Online survey in text format 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study by completing this questionnaire. This 
questionnaire will take no more than 30 minutes to complete. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time simply by exiting the survey. 
Please be assured that the data you provided will remain confidential. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Company Information  
The next few questions ask for some information about your company. Simply put a 
checkmark ( ) in the shaded field(s), or type your answers on the line provided (__). 
 
1.  Where is your company’s headquarter (HQ) located?  
 
 In New Zealand 
 In Australia 
 Elsewhere, please specify: ___________________ 
 
2.  In which year was your company first established in New Zealand or Australia?  
 
Year ____________________ 
 
3.  What is the percentage of foreign ownership of your company? (Note: please 
write 0 % for domestic owned company) 
 
 Approximately _________% of foreign ownership    Not sure 
 
4.  What is the primary industry in which your organization operates (e.g. apparel, 
banking)?  
 
__________________ 
 
5.  Company data: Please complete the following table concerning your company using 
end-of-year data for the years indicated. (Note: please write 0% if your company only 
operate domestically)  
 
 2009 
1. Number of employees in your home country  
2. Annual sales revenue (please specify in NZ $ or AUS $)  
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B.  Offshore Outsourcing Activities  
  
In this section, we are interested in your company’s overall outsourcing experience in all countries. 
Most of the questions ask for your opinion. There are no correct or incorrect answers. Please answer 
each question to the best of your knowledge. 
 
6.  How long has your company been involved in outsourcing activities to foreign 
countries? 
 
______________ (in years) 
 
7.  What percentage of your total business activities (manufacturing or services) is 
comprised of outsourcing activities?  
 
Approximately ______________ % 
 
8.  How would you characterize your primary outsourcing activities? 
  
 Manufacturing    Service  Other ___________ 
 
9.  What is your primary outsourced product or service? 
 
(Please specify) ___________________ 
 
10.  Please list the top three most important countries in which you conduct most of 
your outsourcing activities other than your home country. Please write the name of 
each country (A-B) in the first row, and answer the questions beneath each country 
(please use 2010 data). 
 
 
Country names: 
Country A: 
 
 
Country B: 
 
Year entered   
 
11.  What are your motives for outsourcing? Please rate each of the following items on 
a scale from 1 to 7, where 1= completely unimportant and 7 = extremely important.  
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Completely 
unimportant 
 Extremely 
important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Exploiting technological capabilities        
2. Seeking lower cost (e.g. lower labour and production costs)        
3. Access to new skills and technologies from foreign 
suppliers 
       
4. Focusing on core business        
5. Seeking skilled labour overseas        
6. Following industry competitors        
7. Servicing customers’ needs more effectively        
8. Improving production flow        
 
12.  How does your company conduct outsourcing activities?  
 
 Directly from a foreign country  
 Through an intermediate party (e.g. agent) based at home country or foreign country 
 In combination of above (please indicate percentage of each):   
Direct outsourcing _____________%; through an agent_____________%; 
 
13.  If your company conducts outsourcing activities through intermediate parties, 
where are they located? 
 
 In the home country (e.g. Australia or New Zealand) 
 In the foreign country where your company conduct its outsourcing activities 
 A combination of two answers above 
 Other (please specify): _______________ 
 
14.  How many outsourcing suppliers do you have internationally?  
 
______________ (in numbers) suppliers 
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C.  Outsourcing Activities in China     
 In this section, we are interested specifically in your company’s overall outsourcing experience in 
China. Most of the questions ask for your opinion. There are no correct or incorrect answers. Please 
answer each question to the best of your knowledge. 
 
15.  In which year did you commence your outsourcing activities in China?  
 
Year ________________ 
 
16.  In this section, we are interested in your opinion regarding your main supplier 
relationship in China.   
 
 Main supplier for China 
1. Number of suppliers   
2. How long has your company been working 
with this party? (in month) 
 
 
17.  Please rate how important the main Chinese supplier is relative to your 
company’s overall activities in China on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = completely 
unimportant and 7 = utmost importance.  
 
Completely  
   unimportant 
   Utmost  
 importance 
1. Main Chinese supplier         
 
18.  Please rate how important the main Chinese suppliers is relative to your 
company’s overall activities worldwide on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = completely 
unimportant and 7 = utmost importance. 
 
Completely  
unimportant 
  Utmost  
  importance 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/a 
1. Main Chinese supplier         
 
19.  Please indicate how similar you feel that China is to your own country on a scale 
from 1 to 7, where 1 = completely the same, 4 = moderately similar, and 7 = completely 
different.  
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Completely 
 the same 
  Completely  
different 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Culture        
2. Religion        
3. People’s thinking         
4. The way of doing business        
5. Language        
6. Legal environment        
7. The economic environment        
8. The political environment         
 
20.  Please indicate your familiarity about China as a country on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 = completely unfamiliar, 4 = moderately familiar, and 7 = completely familiar.  
 
Completely 
 unfamiliar 
  Completely  
familiar 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Culture        
2. Religion        
3. People’s thinking         
4. The way of doing business        
5. Language        
6. Legal environment        
7. The economic environment        
8. The political environment         
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D.  Outsourcing Relations  
 In this section, we are interested in your company’s outsourcing relations you're your main Chinese 
supplier.  
 
21.  Based upon your experience with you main Chinese supplier, please indicate the 
extent of your agreement with the following statements about each on a scale from 1 
to 7.  
 
1 = completely disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somehow disagree, 4 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = somehow agree, 6 = agree, 7 = completely agree. If any of the statement 
does not apply to your company, please put N/A instead. 
 
 Main Chinese Supplier 
1. We trust that this supplier makes beneficial decisions for us under 
any circumstances. 
 
 
2. This supplier is willing to provide assistance to us without exception.  
 
3. We are generally sceptical of the information provided to us by this 
foreign supplier. 
 
 
4. Without monitoring, this foreign supplier would fulfil his 
obligations.  
 
 
5. We and this supplier are willing to devote all resources needed for 
the relationship.  
 
 
6. We would not drop this supplier even if another supplier offers us 
better terms.  
 
 
7. We are fully committed to helping this supplier in the long term.  
 
8. We share mutual information with this supplier regarding the 
business environment and technical change that affects each other’s 
businesses. 
 
9. We mutually share proprietary information with this supplier.  
10. We only provide information to this supplier according to a pre-
specified agreement. 
 
11. This supplier lets us know as soon as possible about any unexpected  
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 Main Chinese Supplier 
problems (e.g. late delivery, financial problems). 
12. The communication between us and this supplier is complete and 
thorough.  
 
13. There is no language barrier between us and this supplier.  
14. We have made significant investments for this supplier (e.g. 
upgraded production systems). 
 
15. If we wanted to, we could switch to another supplier quite easily.  
16. If this supplier wanted to, they could easily switch to another client.  
17. Our senior manager has extensive personal relationships with this 
supplier. 
 
18. Based upon our senior manager’s personal relationship with this 
supplier, our company was able to gain privileges.   
 
19. Our senior manager was able to obtain valuable and important 
information based on his/her personal relationship with this supplier. 
 
20. When problem arises, our senior manager contact this supplier for 
resolutions based on their personal relationship.  
 
21. Our outsourcing contract with this supplier is highly customised and 
required considerable legal work. 
 
22. We believe a detailed contract is the most important tool for 
regulating the behaviour of this supplier. 
 
23. When it comes to disputes and arbitration concerning the products 
and services with this supplier, we always follow the terms of the 
contract. 
 
24. Our company-specific routines and workflows are customised to this 
supplier. 
 
25. We invested a significant amount of time in developing the skill level 
of our employees to suit this supplier.  
 
26. It’s very costly for us to switch from this supplier.  
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E.  Outsourcing Challenges  
In this section, we are interested in your company’s opinion on outsourcing challenges.  
 
22.  What do you consider to be the main challenges for your company in developing 
a working relationship with your main Chinese suppliers? Please rate your opinions 
next to each statement on a scale from 1 to 7.  
 
1 = completely disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = completely agree. If any of 
the statements does not apply to your company, please put N/A instead. 
 
 Main Chinese Supplier 
1. The probability of this supplier acting opportunistically is high.  
2. The potential for conflicts regarding the way we do business 
with this supplier is high. 
 
3. The likelihood of this supplier acquiring useful technological 
information from us for their own benefit is high. 
 
 
4. The likelihood of unexpected costs in this working relationship 
is high. 
 
5. This supplier has a tendency of requiring longer lead time than 
others in the past. 
 
 
6. This supplier has a tendency of late delivery issues in the past.  
 
7. This supplier has a tendency of quality issues in the past.  
 
8. Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about 
project scope.  
 
9. Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about 
the project compliance. 
 
10. Our contract with this supplier suffers from lack of detail about 
penalty clauses.  
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F.  Respondent Information  
 
23.  Are you:  Female     Male 
 
24.  What is your current position?  
 Owner/CEO 
 Management team 
 Employee 
 Assistant personnel, administrative, secretarial  
 Other (please specify):_______________________ 
 
25.  Specifically, what is your job title? (e.g. operation manager) 
 
____________________ 
 
26.  Are you the person responsible for decisions made on outsourcing activities in 
your company? 
 
 Yes   No (please specify your responsibility): ________________ 
 
27.  Please indicate your work experience: 
 
Your overall outsourcing experience (in years): ____________ 
 
28.  Are there any other comments you would like to share with us? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
